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Jonathan Seidel is currently studying government at IDC in Israel with a focus on counterterrorism. He is on the debate team and model UN, participating in conferences and expanding knowledge on a wide range of important issues. Jonathan has a long history working with special needs kids and running programs to ensure those kids have amazing experiences. 

Intro-qualms:

Contemporary orthodoxy upholds Maimonides’ thirteen principles as the core of Jewish theology. Dogmas have become a contentious issue due to its compulsive and irrational methodology. Dogma has a long history in religion. Religious beliefs are the basic foundation of religious identity. They formulate the proper origin. The dogmas require belief in the system. Yet, two issues bother me: the first is the ignorance to historic diversity in Judaism and secondly the a-historic Jewish foundations. The former acknowledges the diverse theological perspectives brought by various Jewish thinkers through the centuries. Many of the early mediaeval rabbis engaged in theological discussions constructing varied formulations. Attempting to decipher the accurate dimension of Jewish dogmas. What are the faith articles? How many are there? These questions were answered by a group of philosophically engaged rabbis to defend Jewish honour against their religious counterparts. This undertaking is phenomenal and amazing but if different thinkers have contrasting views, who is correct? What is the metric to determine the accuracy? How does diversity then lead to a uniform model? How could different rabbis from the same tradition construct varied creeds? Do different creeds suppose the lack of theological uniformity? Leading to the second issue. There are diverse models, questioning a congruent origin. If there are diverse creeds, is there a lack of congruent origins? Do earlier rabbinic texts provide a creedal model? Is it then a later rabbinic invention? Which system do we today uphold? Is there room for diversity? If there is no origin, how should modern Jews live religiously?  Dogma is considered a cornerstone of religion but there may be alternative routes. Strict practice may be a genuine model. Forgetting dogma for halakha praxis expression is religious without pondering the nonexistent foundation. In a sense it is overturning the mediaeval invention for ancient practise centricity. Alternatively, dogma is not necessarily congruent with theology. Theology may exist apart from dogma. A supernal identity is plausible without creedal association. Talking about God without doctrinal coercion. Today there is deep suspicion of the supernatural, questioning divine existence. Is there a remedy for modern or postmodern theology? How should the contemporary Jew face these queries? How does he respond? How can he feel competent and comfortable in an uncertain reality?

Early Opponents

            Maimonides’ thirteen principles are considered to be the only word on Jewish theology[1]. Maimonides’ opinions are absolute in contemporary orthodoxy but this is not historically accurate[2]. Maimonides called anyone who did not agree with his model a heretic (Perush Mishnayot, Sanhedrin). His classic opponent the Raavad disagreed with this association (Sanhedrin 10). Nahmanides respected these rabbis even if he disagreed with them theologically (Chidushei HaRamban, Gittin 7b) Maimonides had his model and other authorities had theirs. There is a strand amongst the French rabbis who designated divine physicality[3]. R’ Slifkin argued that Rashi accepted divine corporeality[4]. Maimonides may believe they are heretics but there is no earlier creed to authenticate his claim. Other authorities developed different lists varying from Maimonides. Nahmanides and Abba Mari collected three dogmas for Jews to believe and Hasdai had five, adding prophecy and free will[5]. The diversity of creedal construction was expansive with a lack of uniformity.

            Diversity in Judaism is not something new. Nachmanides and Maimonides disagreed halakhically as well. At times, we uphold Maimonides over Nahmanides[6]. It would not be crazy to accept one and reject the other. This irony is explicitly in Maimonides' rejection of uniform theology. He did not believe there was such singularity in this realm. In three places he rejects this idea (Sota 3:5, Shevot 1:4, Sanhedrin 10:3, Mitzvah negative #132). Even if we were to accept Maimonides' list, do we accept his interpretation of creation or Gersonides (Milchamot Hashem 6) and Ibn Ezra (Genesis 1:1)? The latter believed the world evolved from eternal matter[7]. Maimonides held Moses as the greatest prophet but the Alter Rebbe (Likkutei Amarim, Iggeret Hakodesh #19) and R’ Tzadok (Resisei Layla 79d) believed The Ari (Isaac Luria) was superior. The mystical association with revelation differs heavily from Maimonides uncertainty[8]. Maimonides was even attacked for his indeterminacy of resurrection[9]. Maimonides’ own inconsistencies point to a problematic flaw in systematic theology[10]. There is a trend to consider a uniform model and then confuse its articulation. If Maimonides was insufficient with his creed why should we uphold it as the grace of God?

            There is a major difference between a legal difference and a theological one. In Maimonidean terminology: pre-etz hadaat was truth-falsehood and post-etz hadaat was good-evil (right and wrong) (Guide 1:1)[11]. Halakha corresponds to the latter. Both opinions can be correct but we choose one for practical purposes, this is not the same with hashkafa. A tenant is either true or false. They cannot be both correct. Either God has a body or he does not, there is no “elu velu” (Chullin 13a). Orthodoxy cannot have its cake and eat it too. Dogmas rely on uniform identity. The basic tenant requires an all-encompassing belief. Maimonides heresy-dubbing is the correct measure. He disagrees with others halakhically but does not call them heretics only those who maintain erroneous beliefs. In his philosophy there is no room for diversity as dogma is centre and uniform. Raavid’s response that earlier righteous authorises held different views raises my second query about the centrality and power of dogma in Jewish tradition. The modern uniformity of Maimonides attests to this truth. Theology is a uniform system that cannot be pluralised. Either it is a or it is b; it cannot be both. If so, people are believing in different Gods and that is un-Jewish.

‘Emerging’ Dogma?

            This diversity sparked curiosity into the history of dogma. There is a famous debate between Dr. Kellner and Dr. Berger. The former argues dogma emerged due to Islamic exposure[12] and the latter that dogma is inherent but re-emerged in the Middle Ages in response[13]. One sees it as an invention the other as a resurgence. Dr. Berger notes the Talmud’s insistence on accepting certain criteria but Dr. Kellner denies its dogmatism. Yet, even if Dr. Berger is correct, the Talmudic passage does not accord with Maimonides’ list. Resurrection does occur in both listings but misses the corporeal account that Maimonides insists. Additionally, there is a Talmudic passage stating that Joshua wrote the last eight verses, an opinion Maimonides’ loathes (Bava Batra 15a)[14]. Despite its Talmudic origin, Maimonides would describe such an individual as a heretic. Dr. Berger at his best is recognising an original system but his list would divert from Maimonides[15]. Dogma existing does not mean Maimonides is correct. Contemporary orthodoxy can accept Maimonides but it cannot assert Maimonides received it from an earlier source. Even if dogma is not an invention, Maimonides’ list is. Dr. Kellner at his best eschews theology as a facet[16]. It was a social construction and need not exist today. Dr. Kellner seems to posit a legal-centric philosophy instead. It is not that dogma is dangerous but lacks uniformity in the Torah. The rabbis did not systematise a theology that is respected today. Maimonides’ diversion made a new framework.

            Prof. Berman argues the ancient world lacked a term for ‘belief’ all the more so a creed[17]. People believed in gods but there was no term to capture a systematised faith. Dogma entered the scene with the rise of Christianity. Christianity attempted to unite diverse people with uniform belief. Greeks and Romans though living in different areas could be connected by the same belief; it was a meta-level of communal cohesion. The first type of religious universalism. Islam was affected by the Christian creed and enforced its own model to counter. Ironically, it was not the Jews in Christian lands but those in muslim lands that were constructing creeds[18]. Of the names mentioned above: Maimonides, Nahmanides, R’ Albo, and R’ Crescas, all are Sephardi Jews. Sephardi Jews were engaged in philosophy in contrast to their Ashkenazi counterparts. Due to the philosophical invasion of Islamic culture, the Jewish response was engaged to fight for their Jewish legitimacy. Maimonides’ creed was fueled by islamic pressure. Prof. Pill traced Islamic intellectual development provoking Jewish theological implementation[19].

            The rabbinic model did not reject dogma, it merely subverted it. The transition to theology from legal-centricity was a philosophical response to surrounding pressure. Judaism was not devoid of theology but it was not dogmatic. There is a difference between rabbinic theology and Maimonidean theology. R’ Kadushin saw a varied appreciation of theological concepts as valuational and not creedal or non-hierarchical[20]. R’ Kadushin’s position is unaligned with Dr. Kellner’s position. R’ Kadushin is noting theological components but these are not tenants. It is also possible the Talmudic dogma is a Christian response. The Mishnah was codified during the rise of Christianity. The creedal model had already begun to spread. Still, R’ Kadushin’s motive does portray an intriguing perspective to Jewish theology.

Religious Warfare

            In recent centuries dogma and really metaphysics has been attacked[21]. Mendelssohn infamously rejected Jewish dogma[22]. More recently, Prof. Roth said Judaism was ‘dogmalessness’[23]. Earlier, R’ Crescas provided autonomy to dictate the norms without a divine compass (Or Hashem pg. 168). The Chida followed suit (Chaim Shoel 98) permitting people to speak their dogmatic minds. Prof. Jacob Katz maintained orthodoxy is a misnomer borrowing its term from Christianity. Judaism is really orthoprax[24]. There is no law requiring dogmatic approaches, just legal observance[25]. There has been a growth of orthopraxy in academia but some orthodox authorities fear this trend. R’ Blau argues against it[26]. Law needs theology because without it we are reduced to mindless behaviourism[27]. Turning Jewish law into pan-halakhicism[28]; law without spirit. Famously, Prof. Leibowitz eschewed theological questions relying on commandments for connection[29]. Most modern thinkers ignore theology. R’ Soloveitchik committed himself to Halakhic-centricity. His Halakhic Man does not look to dogma[30]. He may refer to it but only a conciliatory measure. It is secondary to the legal expression. R’ Soloveitchik reimagined the creation story into a philosophical dialectic[31] and R’ Kook described Eden as an allegory (Igrot ha-Ra’aya 1, #134).

            The most ironic aspect is the Maimonidean creed is maintained but other theological facets: demons, the angels, Eden are literally accepted by orthodox individuals yet rejected by Maimonides (Hilchot Avodah Zara 4:7, 11:16, Guide 3:46)[32]. Maimonides was berated by later authorities for his rejection of long-held Jewish positions. Abarbanel[33] argued that he was stirred by gentile association and Vilna Gaon stated that he was duped by Aristotle (Biur HaGra 13)[34]. Rationally it makes sense why he struggled to accept the irrationality of demons and other superstitious and supernatural phenomena. It is plausible that Maimonides' list is condensed to what he could accept. Yet, he is willing to forgo creation if Aristotle is correct. Nahmanides would be horrified. A tenant is a tenant.

Heads or Tails 

            There are two responses to be intellectually honest and still accept dogma or to reject it. There is a growing faction of Jews who are solely legally observant. They reject the dogmatic aspects but keep halakha. The social orthodox in Wittgenstein fashion do not concern with the dogmatic aspects. There is a cultural affiliation. The orthoprax model is centred on halakhic expression in light of philological and historical inconsistencies. There is a necessity to base Judaism in halakha. Judaism is not a religion of law in the sense that it is devoid of the spirit but it is legal in its religious expression. Spirituality can persist but that does not necessitate compelling specific belief. Dogma is not essential for observance but it is empowering.

Dogma has its purpose and should not be neglected entirely. R’ Blau points out the need for a sourced ideological front to halakhic practice[35]. Theology is the device that differentiates from other religions. The Maimonidean stream contests against Islamic creed. For him, orthoprax Judaism is unacceptable[36]. There is a lack of connection between the act and its origin. Halakhic practice without a linked past defeats the whole original purpose. The belief justifies the continuous action by maintaining the teleological genus. The goal is maintained. Beliefs articulate the religious atmosphere. It is not just tribal action but a celestial link. A tradition upheld.

            On the other side is Prof. Sagi’s interpretation of Prof. Leibowitz[37]. It is true he avoided such questions and concentrated instead of full observance to God. Yet, his allegiance to God is theological even if Prof. Sagi states otherwise. Prof. Leibowitz did eschew theological jargon[38]. He was unwilling to base his religiosity on theology. There is no affirmation based on a factual basis but on a leap of faith. Instead of articulating truth claims, he instead wished to simply believe[39]. Prof. Leibowitz though did not reject theology for its logic but its meaninglessness. For Prof. Leibowitz it was values not truth claims. He felt this model undermined proper worship. It is not truth claims that bring one to God but faith.

            Halakha is the centre of Jewish life. It is the everyday life of the Jew. Theological discussions are rare in the community. Contemporary orthodoxy falls into two camps: the extreme negative rationalists[40] and the immanent mystics[41]. Though even if this is the case, there is a lack of engagement with the theological sphere[42]. People may assign themselves into spheres more of divine interaction or not but rarely ponder more deeply. My concerns will probably fall on deaf ears to many contemporary Jews. There is a sincere lack of proper engagement. People just do not care or uncomfortable with the term[43]. This will only lead to heresy-hunting. If people are unaware of the vast literature they will simply regurgitate what was taught by their teachers, funnelled through an echo-chamber. To an extent many Jews follow the halakhic-centric model but do maintain Maimonides’ principles. They may not contemplate theology but they are willing to internalise the tenants educated in their seminaries. Since belief is a private matter as long as someone continues to follow the law, no one will notice otherwise. If we both keep shabbat no one will assume that I do not regard the historical revelation. They will only know if I tell them. In many ways the halakhic-centric model salvages the sceptics for uniform halakha.

            When the sceptic speaks out he is shunned. He is hunted as a heretic. There is a difficulty to maintain those who divert from the mainstream. Despite a focus on halakha, beliefs are powerful. Many Jews base their practice in literal revelation. If God did not gift the Torah to the Jews, or if it all did not emerge at Sinai, then it is no good. It’s all or nothing. I do not really understand this qualm. From a faith persistence perspective, it does make sense but that is thinking futuristically, not in the present. One can maintain his halakhic commitment without dogma[44]. Whether his children will be is uncertain. I do think there is an honesty that can prevail over this ‘blemish’ in faith. Then again there is a powerful metaphorical truth that supersedes literal truth[45]. The sceptic should externally demonstrate full belief for the sake of continuity. The abstraction of Maimonides beliefs with their celestial aura have no bearing on scientific analysis. Did revelation occur? Maybe, maybe not. Is it religiously binding? Yes. Removing a ‘myth’ denies the origin, compromising faith. Leibowitz ingeniously disregarded religious facts but relied on absolute command-ness to a real God. The sceptic can survive but will his children? Only time will tell.

            Historically, dogma was invented but belief was not. Revelation even if not a dogma is a wide-held belief of Jews. It is the genus of Jewish practice. Strauss contended it was the basis for Jewish law. I perceive the halakha as a constitution of sorts but that is a singular opinion and not everyone will do so. I also am more into the values than dogma but values are not as binding in contemporary orthodoxy[46]. One can have Jewish values without Jewish law. It is a query I continue to ponder. Despite my uncertainty, it is better to shy on the side of actuality with a constitutional back-up than deny the historical source[47]. Science is not absolute and believing in the supernatural is plausible even if not rationally[48]. There exists an existential leap of faith but I do think there is more trans-generational evidence than logical evidence necessary. As much as we moderns loathe former generations, they lived ethical valuable lives. They were imperfect but there were underlying values and lifestyles to emulate[49]. If my ancestors have believed in revelation, why shouldn’t I? Because science can prove otherwise? Because it seems ridiculous? There is a rational side that needs to humble itself in the face of indeterminacy or infinity. That is faith and loyalty.

Divine Revival

            There is a way back into theology. A new epistemological ground to cover. I hesitate to associate with the mystics but there are models to cleave. Even a sceptic who dislikes dogma need not reject theology. Theology plays a prominent role in biblical and rabbinic thinking. Theology is not just the inner life of God but the lessons derived. We need not embark on the ‘god-talk’ phenomenon. To refer back to Kadushin, there is a discourse that is exemplified through divine expression rather than divine ontology[50]. The classic aggadah is filled with supernal narratives with insightful messages. Prof. Fisher makes an intriguing point about rabbinic theology more about hermeneutics than truth; methodological than historical[51]. Prof. Fisher opts for an ancient theological representation than its modern definition. The philosophical life is not one of truth but living.

            Jewish theology needs to be practical not just theoretical. Prof. Fisher posits a doxastic approach[52]. His hermeneutical approach to rabbinic theology attempts to link man with God in an eternally binding relationship. Exegesis is therefore for the Sages a method of further narration of divine amazement to legitimise their religious life. It is the exegesis that deepens the layer of the plain meaning to better understand scriptural narrative. There are divine values that the rabbis expressed through their interpretative prowess[53]. It is theology that leads to observance. The rabbinic model is linked with the past to carve a halakhic future. The use of scripture to then exegetically promote halakha as seen in the Mekhilta 1:167 concerning the famed ‘Az Yashir’ (Song of the Sea): accepting one commandment is worthy of divine spirit and then the statement finishes with a scriptural source. Rabbinic theology is less systematic yet vast and penetrating.

            Other Rabbis have demonstrated other theological methodologies. R’ Sacks morphed his theology with biblical imagery[54]. The Bible is a book of responsibility of the other[55]. His mussar-like attitude provoked grand elevating attitudes from biblical messages. His demonstration of biblical verses and narratives is to hone a universalist affect[56]. The bible is a book about the Jews but it has so much more to offer. This conception is similar to Prof. Peterson. Many of his lectures, though he does delve into the New Testament, educate lessons for modern life[57]. Though of different religions and quite varied theologies, both conceivably provide theological narration in the form of ethical maturation. Many academics have also turned to biblical theology as a source of Jewish insight. R’ Heschel returned to the prophets to inspire spiritual reflection. His concept of divine pathos illustrates the overwhelming prophetic encounter[58]. R’ Heschel’s goal was to revive the spirit over the negligent rationalist philosophy[59]. It is about values employed. Similar to R’ Sacks, the Biblical philosophy was victorious in securing democracy, while philosophy led to deadly revolutions[60]. Both thinkers wished to shed the external philosophical foci that overshadowed Judaism. The bible is pure in its Jewish origin not marked by hellenistic or western coercion. Yet both these thinkers had varied destinations. Sacks wished to inspire biblical lessons and Heschel to recover biblical imagination. 

            Mystic theology or hasidic theology has grown in previous years under the guise of neo-hasidut. There are a few frames for this movement, I will focus on four: R’ Kook, R’ Green, R’ Weinberger, and R’ Shagar. I omit Buber from this list because though his thought is incredibly influential, his relevance is less Jewish and more Christian. R’ Kook reimagined mysticism in the modern age. His excellence in Torah and kabbalah is unmatched. His religious philosophy has encompassed most of Israeli religiosity. His theology partnered with a panentheistic perspective[61]. That God is in everything, yet beyond simultaneously. A deep sense of divine unification and for man to unite body and spirit[62]. His theology utilises kabbalastic doctrines to employ religious motivation[63]. His esoteric model leads from the depths of hell to peaks of salvation. As one example, the treachery of WWI led to the Balfour declaration and presumably the holocaust to the state of Israel[64]. R’ Kook’s view was messianic in esoteric fashion. This theology procured divine immanence in human everyday life. R’ Green would be a candidate for heterodox mystical theology. His prioritisation of theology over ritual hints at my untraditional view[65]. He opined by a Hasidic religious naturalism[66]. This lacks a belief in an active literal God. He utilises Hasidic motifs to bolster his transcendent metaphorical theology. R’ Shagar alternatively, took a more orthodox route but grounded postmodern thinking. His insistence on silence in contrast to R’ Sack’s conversation, is his mystical association with the unknown[67]. R’ Shagar reinterprets faith in Lacanian terminology as the real, primordial real pre-lingual residing in the mystical[68]. Postmodern rhetoric hides a divine sensation ready to be exposed. The esoteric breaking of vessels is akin to postmodern deconstruction. The solution is to reunite the vessels via reconstruction[69]. Lastly, R’ Weinberger would not necessarily call his work theology but I do think listening to any of his hour long lectures on YU torah from the late 90s is quite the experience. He aligns himself with the breath of hasidut furthering mystical ideas with empowering lessons[70]. Similar to R’ Sacks, there is an empowerment telos yet more spiritually inclined. The stories, songs, and ideas promote a better spiritual connection to God.    

            There are additional models of modern jewish theology in the form of holocaust and feminist theologies. Profs. Emil Fackenheim[71] and Tamar Ross[72] respectively are big names in these areas. I have exhausted an account of Jewish theology to demonstrate the varied approaches to Jewish theology that are not dogmatic. None of the previous paragraphs oppose Maimonides but they can be an alternative. To conclude I think there is one last unconventional position is that of R’ Gillman’s mythic anthropology[73]. He notes that there is a solution for the sceptic[74]. It is not to reject everything but recognise the pattern and significance the event has to the formation of Judaism. R’ Gillman’s model is heterodox but it does provide solace to the struggler. There is no need to believe in literal revelation insofar as it is valuable to history. The fabrication of literal revelation is a mythic archetype denoting divine relationship and/or authority. In this vein, theology and even dogma is important. The belief in the myth is a testament to religious history and its continuity.

            Theology is a mainstay of Judaism and will remain that way. It should be studied and internalised[75]. The systemisation of dogma though may cast a shadow on religious life it does provide us with the necessary creed. Still, dogma need not take the place of religious values. We believe but we must revamp why we do so, employing the merits that underlie our belief. Judaism is a religion of action. A community and a family. We share a collective belief and should accept our doctrines but interpretively leave that to the individual.

[1] See: Marc B. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised Oxford and Portland, Oregon: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2004. The Thirteen Principles of Rambam. In his review of Dr. Shapiro’s book R’ Zev Leff argues just as the Shulchan Aruch was accepted by all of Israel so too the principles despite disagreements. Chatam Sofer makes a similar claim about what one is permitted to believe (Yoreh Deah 356). 
[2] See: Jacob J. Petuchowski, "Manuals and Catechism of the Jewish Religion in the Early Period of Emancipation" Studies in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Intellectual History ed. Alexander Altmann, (Cambridge, 1964), pg. 56ff.
[3] R’ Taku protested against those who mitigated anthropomorphic texts (Ketav Tamim pp. 85-86). R’ Taku noted that God could take form if he wished (pp. 59-60). R’ Eliezer of worms and R’ Yehuda haChasid also may fit the criteria. See: Ephraim Kanarfogel, “Varieties of Belief in Medieval Ashkenaz: The Case of Anthropomorphism,” Rabbinic Culture and Its Critics: Jewish Authority, Dissent, and Heresy in Medieval and Early Modern Times eds. Daniel Frank and Matt Goldish (Detroit: Wayne State University Press 2008), pg. 137.
[4] Natan Slifkin, “Was Rashi a Corporealist” Haikirah 26.
[5] Solomon Schechter, “The Dogmas of Judaism” The Jewish Quarterly Review 1:1 pp. 48-61.
[6] Tabernacle, Sacrifices, and Judaism: Maimonides vs. Nahmanides - TheTorah.com. 
[7] Jacob Shem Tov, Zafnat Pane'ah, ed. David Herzog (Heidelberg, 1911), pp. 28-30, 41. Maimonides may not have counted creation as one of the principles like Nahmanides because it could be scientifically disproven. He asserts the text must align with science. If Maimonides upheld a dogma he was willing to alter with science, how doctrinal is it really? One can assume there is a categorical acceptance but not details. See: Re-imagining Orthodox.
[8] Maimonides writes God gave the Torah to Moses even if he cannot explain how  (Perush Mishnayot Sanhedrin chapter 10).
[9] D.J. Silver, Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy, 1180–1240. J.G. Brull, Leiden, 1965, pp. 109-135. Many nerves were calmed after Maimonides wrote his treatise of resurrection.
[10] Marc Shapiro, “Maimonides' Thirteen Principles: The Last Word in Jewish Theology?” The Torah U-madda Journal Vol. 4 pp. 194-195.
[11] Rambam on Man in the Garden of Eden. 
[12] Menachem Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything? London and Portland, Oregon, 1999 pp. 49-51.
[13] David Berger, “Review of Menachem Kellner’s Must a Jew Believe Anything?” Tradition 33:4 pg. 83.
[14] Ibn Ezra (Deuteronomy 34:1), R’ Meyuhas (Perush al Sefer Devarim 34:1), Chatam Sofer (Torat Moshe Deutonomy 34:1). Ibn Ezra even argued for post-mosaic texts (Deuteronomy 34:6). Others agree with this opinion as well: R’ Avigdor Katz. See: Zevi Hirschl and Jacob Zimmels, Abhandlungen zur Erinnerung an Hirsch Perez Chajes, Vienna, 1933, pg. 259 and R’ Yehuda haChasid in Perushei ha-Torah le-Rabbi Yehudah he-Hasid, Jerusalem, 1975, pp. 64, 138, 198. See also: Authorship of the Torah: The Position of Ibn Ezra and R. Yehuda HaChasid - TheTorah.com. R’ Cherlow, a prominent israeli religious authority, maintains these diversities. R’ Cherlow argues for a holistic space where the believer can retain the diversity of thought with an emboldened belief in God with the simplest of divine revelation. 
[15] Shapiro, ibid. pg. 198. See also n. 268. Maimonides in opposition to the Mishnah does not ascribe any Pentuechal origin to resurrection only prophetic sources. 
[16] See Sagi below.
[17] See: Joshua A. Berman, Ani Maamin: Biblical Criticism, Historical Truth, and the Thirteen Principles of Faith (Maggid Books, 2020), pp. 192-195. See also: Orthopraxy does not negate beliefs, it simply does not assume any monumental truths or “right beliefs”. See also: HellenicGods.org - ORTHODOXY AND ORTHOPRAXY IN HELLENISMOS. This article argues that the hellenic religion, Ællinismόs, indeed may incline towards practice but does not relinquish belief. Ællinismόs and the rabbinic mind parallel in affirming truths without dogmatising them.
[18] Berman, ibid.
[19] Shlomo C. Pill, “Law as Faith, Faith as Law: The Legalization of Theology in Islam and Judaism in the Thought of Al-Ghazali and Maimonides” Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic Law, 6(1).
[20] Max Kadushin, The Rabbinic Mind (New York: Bloch, 1972) [3rd edition] pg. 340.
[21] David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pg. 152, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1929, pp. B76, 178, and recently, Rudolph Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 pp. 20-40 The revival of metaphysics has begun. See: W.V. Quine, “On What There Is” From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961, pg. 139, Saul Kripke, Naming and necessity Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, pp. 54-56 and David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 3-4.
[22] Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or on Religious Power and Judaism, trans. Allan Arkush, introduction and commentary by Alexander Altmann Hanover (N.H.) and London: University Press of New England for Brandeis University Press, 1983. R’ Schechter claims that Mendelssohn contradicts himself assuming there are unique dogmas. See: Solomon Schechter, “The Dogmas of Judaism” The Jewish Quarterly Review 1:1 pg. 48.
[23] Leon Roth, "Fundamentalism and Judaism," L'Eylah 25 (April, 1988) pg. 9
[24] Jacob Katz, “Orthodoxy in Historical Perspective,” Studies in Contemporary Jewry 2 pp. 3-17. Prof. Twersky wrote that “halakhocentricity is the hallmark of historic Judaism.” Isadore Twersky, “Religion and Law,” Religion in a Religious Age, ed. S. D. Goitein (Cambridge, MA: Association For Jewish Studies, 1974), pg. 70.
[25] Michael J. Broyde, “Proselytism in Jewish Law: Inreach, Outreach, and the Jewish Tradition” Sharing The Book Religious Perspectives on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism 45, eds. John Witte, Jr. & Richard C. Martin, 1999, pp. 52-59. Conversion requires legal quandaries not specified beliefs.
[26] Yitzchak Blau, “Flexibility With a Firm Foundation: On Maintaining Jewish Dogma” The Torah U-madda Journal Vol. 12, pp. 181-183.
[27] ibid.
[28] Abraham Joshua Heschel, God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism, New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1955 pg. 328.
[29] Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State, trans. Eliezer Goldman, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992, pp. 75-76.
[30] Soloveitchik himself never rejected theology but in his The Lonely Man of Faith he acknowledges theological issues but states that they do not bother him. See: Joseph B. Soloveitchik, The Lonely Man of Faith New York: Doubleday, 1992, pp. 5-6. Additionally, he downplays aggadah/theology for halakha. See: Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man, trans. Lawrence Kaplan (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983, pp. 252, 282. Following the brisker, halakhic-centric mentality, theology is an afterthought. See: Chaim Saiman, “Legal Theology: The Turn to Conceptualism in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Law” Journal of Law and Religion 21:1, pp. 75, 84-85.
[31] Soloveitchik, Lonely pp. 13-15. See also: See: Shupert Spero, “The Biblical Stories, Garden of Eden and The Flood: History or Metaphor?” Tradition 33:2 pg. 16
[32] Radbaz (Responsa, vol. 5 no. 153), R. Yosef Kafach (Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Shabbos ch. 19 n. 33, R. Chaim Elazar Shapiro (Nimukei, Orach Chaim 301:3). The Gra (Bi’ur ha-Gra, Yoreh De’ah, 179:6 note 13) famously stated Maimonides’s mind was confused by philosophy yet the Chida holds like Maimonides (Birkei Yosef, Orach Chaim 301:6) as well as his son (Ma’amar al Derashot Chazal) and Ralbag (Parashat Ha’azinu). See: Marc Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides and his Interpreters (University of Scranton Press, 2008) pp. 106-111 and WRESTLING DEMONS.
[33] Don Issac Abarbanel, Principles of Faith: Rosh Amana trans. Menachem Kellner. Littman Library Of Jewish Civilization, 2004 pg. 194.
[34] See: The Attitude of the Vilna Gaon Towards Moreh Nevuchim. It is worth noting that Abarbanel disagreed with Maimonides that the entire Torah was dictated by God to Moses. He believes that Moses wrote the entire book of Deuteronomy and God gave his divine seal (Commentary on Deuteronomy pg. 5) not just certain sections like Ibn Ezra. These scholars are heretics in Maimonides’ opinion. See further Nahmanides' conflicting position of God’s absolute dictation in his intro and Moses’ independent agenda to record “that God had not commanded him to do so” in writing. See: Yaakov Elman “The Book of Deuteronomy as Revelation: Nahmanides and Abarbanel” Hazon Nahum: Studies in Jewish Law, Thought, and History Presented to Dr. Norman Lamm on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday, eds. Yaakov Elman and Jeffrey S. Gurock, (New York: Ktav, 1997) pp. 238-239.
[35] Blau, ibid.
[36] ibid.
[37] Avi Sagi, Jewish Religion After Theology, Academic Studies Press, 2009, pp. 107-137.
[38] Leibowitz, ibid.
[39] Leibowitz, Faith, History, and Values, Jerusalem: Academon, 1982, pp. 154-155 [Hebrew]. See also: Eliezer Goldman, “Revelation in Philosophical Discourse” De’ot 46, pg. 64 [Hebrew]. Profs. Leibowitz and Goldman both reject metaphysics but are readily in line with a transcendent God (though the latter with a larger human element). See: Yeshayahu Leibowitz, “Belief, Religion and Science,” Yahadut, Am Yehudi u-Medinat Yisrael (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1976), pg. 343 and Eliezer Goldman, “On the Illusory Faith”, On Faith, eds. Moshe Halbertal, David Kurzweil and Avi Sagi, Jerusalem, 2014, pp. 119-130.
[40] See: Daniel Statman, “Negative Theology and the Meaning of the Commandments” Tradition 39.1 pp. 69-70. Statman argues contemporary orthodoxy has latched onto an extreme version of negative theology, losing the divine recognition.
[41] The rise of neo-hasidut has contributed to this phenomenon. See: Weinberger, Infra. We must not forgot the haredi ideology. R’ Yuter exposes the hypocrisy of R’ Danziger who accepts Maimonides principles but not his negative theology and aligns his view with the consverative movement. See: Alan Yuter, “Positivist Rhetoric and Its Functions in Haredi Orthodoxy” Jewish Political Studies Review 8:1/2 pg. 138. Prof. Brown argues that haredi theology exists even if they deny it. See: Benjamin Brown, “Orthodox Judaism” The Blackwell Companion to Judaism (2000), pg. 332. Da’as Torah and Yeridat Hadorot as two held dogmas. There is much opposition from the orthodox side: Nachum Eliezer Rabinovitch, “What is Emunat Hakhamim” Hakirah 5, pg 35 and If There Is No “Da'at,” How Can We Have Leadership?. For the latter see: Norman Lamm, Torah U'Madda: The Encounter of Religious Learning and Worldly Knowledge in the Jewish Tradition, Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1990, pg. 90.  
[42] David Shatz, “Remembering Marvin Fox: One Man’s Legacy to Jewish Thought” Tradition 36:1 pp. 64-65. Dr. Shatz acknowledges there is an expansion from strict Talmud learning to Biblical study but “few have a vision of maturing in their conceptions of Ha-Kadosh Barukh Hu and how He governs the world”.
[43] David Novak, “Jewish Theology” Modern Judaism 10 pg. 311.
[44] Jay Lefkowitz, “The Rise of Social Orthodoxy: A Personal Account” Commentary, 2014. Mr. Lefkowitz speaks about the social orthodox phenomenon. Jews who keep halakha but do not abide by the dogma. Much of the response opposed a position mitigating divine authority and divine revelation See: Our readers, “Is ‘Social Orthodoxy’ Orthodox? Responses to Jay P. Lefkowitz's, “The Rise of Social Orthodoxy”” Commentary, 2014.  R’ Kaplan argued for a new vision of God. His naturalistic God is a “power” in reality. God is natural, not supernatural. Mordecai Kaplan, The Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994), pg.14. Prof. Leo Strauss pushed back on arguing that replacing God in the Jewish tradition is obstructing it. See: Leo Strauss, “Why We Remain Jews”, JPCM pg. 34. In a way he is saying Judaism cannot accept Einstein’s God. To Prof. Strauss, God is a central anchor to the Jewish religion.
[45] Bret Weinstein Defines Metaphorical Truth (Animated Text).
[46] See my: Angelic Ideals for Jewish metaphysics girded in values rather than dogma. 
[47]  See my: (A)Typical Tools. Through excessive citation in response to greek statutor-isation, the Bible became a legal code. See also: Daniel Elezar, “Halakhic Interpretations from a Constitutional Perspective” Jewish Political Studies Review 8:1-2 pp. 189-204.
[48] The Varieties of Scientific Experience: Carl Sagan on Science and Spirituality and Nonreligious Divinity in the Known and the Unknowable: Alan Lightman on Science and Spirituality.
[49] Sacks discusses the erosion of values: the sanctity of marriage and loyalty to employees. Covenant & Conversation | Tetzaveh | The Ethic of Holiness | Rabbi Sacks. His 
[50] Kadushin, ibid.
[51] Cass Fisher, “Beyond the Homiletical: Rabbinic Theology as Discursive and Reflective Practice” The Journal of Religion 90:2, n. 14.
[52] ibid. pg. 219. See also: Fisher, “Jewish Philosophy: Living Language at Its Limits” Jewish Philosophy for the Twenty-First Century. Brill, 2014, pp. 92-93.
[53] ibid. pp. 221, 232.
[54] Jonathan Sacks, Crisis and Covenant: Jewish Thought after the Holocaust (Manchester, 1992), pp. 180, 240-241. See also: Alan Jotkowitz, “The Return of Biblical Theology: Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks and the Theological-Literary Movement” Modern Judaism 42:1, pp. 27-42.
[55] Sacks, To Heal a Fractured World: The Ethics of Responsibility (London, 2005), pg. 134.
[56] Sacks, The Dignity of Difference (London, 2002), pg. 64.
[57] Biblical Series I: Introduction to the Idea of God Transcript.
[58] Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets, New York: Harper & Row, 1962 pp. 285-298.
[59] Heschel, Man’s Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1954), pg. 103.
[60] Jonathan Sacks, The Great Partnership: Science, Religion, and the Search for Meaning, Schocken; reprint edition, 2014, pp. 139-141.
[61] Orot Zaronim 1 and Shemoneh Kevatzim 1:95-96.  
[62] See: Norman Lamm, “The Unity Theme and its Implications for Moderns” Tradition 4:1, pp. 56-58.
[63] ibid. pg. 45.
[64] Yehudah Mirsky, “From Every Heresy, Faith, and Holiness from Every Defiled Thing: Towards Rav Kook’s Theology of Culture” Developing a Jewish Perspective on Culture ed. Y. Sarna, Jersey City: University Press/Ktav, 2014, pg. 139.
[65] Arthur Green, “A Neo-Hasidic Life: Credo and Reflections,” Personal Theology: Essays in Honor of Neil Gillman ed. William Plevan, Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2013, pp. 67-69.
[66] Green, “Neo-Hasidism and Our Theological Struggles,” Ra’ayonot 4:3 pg. 15.
[67] See: Alan Jotkowitz, “‘And Now the Child Will Ask’: The Post-Modern Theology of Rav Shagar.” Tradition:  45:2 pp. 53-54.
[68] Shimon Gershon Rosenberg, Faith Shattered and Restored: Judaism in the Postmodern Age, ed. Zohar Maor, Jerusalem: Maggid, 2017, pg. 33.
[69] ibid. pg. 128.
[70] Moshe Weinberger, “Chassidus for non-Chassidim: A Modern Experiment in Chassidus” Jewish Action 5760 no. 1 and Binyamin Ehrenkranz, “Embracing Chassidus: Q. & A. with Rabbi Moshe Weinberger” Jewish Action 5775 no. 2.
[71] Emil L. Fackenheim, To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought, Indiana University Press, 1994.
[72] Tamar Ross, Expanding the Palace of Torah: Orthodoxy and Feminism, Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2004.
[73] Neil Gillman, Sacred Fragments: Recovering Theology for the Modern Jew (JPS: Philadelphia, 1990), pp. 25-30.
[74] ibid. See also: Norman Solomon, Torah from Heaven: The Reconstruction of Faith, Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Littman, 2012, pp. 320-321.
[75] Novak, Supra.