National Scholar Updates

The pattern is much the same everywhere – because the cause and effect is the same everywhere. It's probably true that the new communication technologies are catalyzing the process, but that process existed in ancient and medieval times too, so only the externals have changed, not the substance.

The process I'm referring to is the backlash on the part of the poor against the predatory rich. In medieval times, peasants' revolts were commonplace – not surprising, given the miserable lot of the serfs. But it is worth noting that then, as now and as ever, it was the participation and usually the leadership of the middle-class that was essential to give the peasant mob a fighting chance against the rich – then the nobility – who controlled all the resources.

The growth of the middle-class in the modern period was supposed to have made the idea of peasant revolts passé – and for a time it really seemed that way. Nowhere was this truer than in the United States, where the essence of the American dream was that the class and status you were born into did not determine your fate, lot and life-story. Even in class-bound Britain and Europe, the rise of universal and largely free education drove a move away from aristocracy and towards meritocracy. The odds were still stacked in favor of the haves, but the chances of a have-not joining them were vastly improved.

This was not the case in the un- and less-developed world, and nowhere was this clearer than in the Arab countries. Thus, when the "Arab Spring" erupted almost a year ago, the reaction in much of the developed world was one of patronizing support for the demonstrators – who, for their part, followed the classic pattern of middle-class leadership of an urban mob, with the rural (and mostly conservative) population largely sidelined.

However, during the course of 2011, the pattern has extended not merely across the Arab world, but also into the developed world, from Europe's Mediterranean south across the continent – Britain providing an especially horrific example of mob violence. In Israel, of course, we have had a powerful dose of protest. Belatedly, the expression of open, widespread and so far largely peaceful protest, has spread to the US, where it began fittingly enough in Wall Street, but is now rapidly going nationwide.

The rationale for reviewing this now is not because it is finished. On the contrary, it is a safe bet that we will see much more of this pattern of protest in the coming year – and that it will be more intense, more bitter and encompass more countries. But now is the time for Jews, at least, to relate to the forces driving the protest/ backlash/ revolt that is taking place across the world and which, everywhere, is the result of a culture of greed and excess in which a tiny elite appropriated the bulk of a country's or a society's wealth, impoverishing the majority or, in more fortunate cases, leaving it a steadily shrinking share.

Why now? Because the main theme of our Holy Day season as a whole, is to ask what's it all about – at the individual and societal level. The passage from Isaiah read on Yom Kippur morning is rightly viewed as a seminal text for social justice, and the quotation in the title of this essay is one key component of that manifesto. But the second half of that verse – "and bring the desperate poor into thy house" – is interpreted in the Talmud not as a moral exhortation but as sound advice: if you don’t share your bread with the hungry, don’t be surprised if the desperate poor come knocking – not necessarily very politely – on your door.

There are people, even in America, who understand this simple equation. Jeffery Hollender was here this week, talking about the social, moral and ethical issues that underlie the economic and financial crisis (Google him and read some of his stuff – it's worth it and it's not written in academese). But the moneyed class, which is now centered on the financial elite, and which has effectively bought control of the government and its agencies, is blind and deaf not merely to moral suasion, but to the common sense version of Isaiah's prophecy.

They, like all their predecessors and their contemporaries around the world, are doomed and they will be swept away in the rising tide of protest and revolt. But it is still possible for 'Main Street' America to wrest back control of the country and society from the Wall Street elite and its self-serving but ultimately destructive creed. Fortunately, Israel's society – as well as its economy and financial system – are in better shape or, more correctly, are less far gone in terms of the extent of the moral rot characterizing them. That's a good starting point for what is sure to be a tough year.

“Imagination is more important than knowledge.”

—Albert Einstein

“Pyramids, cathedrals, and rockets exist not because of geometric theories of structures or thermodynamics, but because they were first a picture—literally a vision in the minds of those who built them.”

—Historian Eugene Ferguson

Introduction

Art education is rarely prioritized in Jewish Day School curricula. A double curriculum of secular and religious studies often leaves little time for subjects whose importance is “still questioned.” Even in the best of secular schools, art education often survives, but only on a year-to-year basis with the constant threat of being slashed. If not for the monitoring by the education watchdogs and the relentless hard work of art advocates, there would be many artless schools in America and even more artless Jewish Day Schools.

The fact that art is offered in some schools and not others is nothing new. Many administrators or school boards have considered an art program “glorified busywork” and do not really understand the nature of art and its value to society. While no one group can be blamed for this misunderstanding, arguably most everyone who is against art programs rarely cares enough to give the matter of art education serious thought. As a result, the average Jewish Day School graduate, like most secular school graduates, is probably a victim of a passive attitude toward art education that often translates into no art classes being offered. There is a sad irony in this situation because the arts have always played a major role in Judaism. In this essay, therefore, I will argue that it is essential to have an art program in a Jewish Day School, and present ideas for what I think a rich art curriculum should consist of, taking into account limits on time that result from a “double curriculum.”

Before I talk about art education in a Jewish Day School setting, it is important to define what art is. It is commonly held that the definition of art has changed many times since the cave paintings were first created 40,000 years ago. It started with “art is magic,” then moved to “art is beauty and emotion,” then to “art is the artist’s view of the world,” and on and on and on. Each culture has defined art in its own way, depending on the time, the place, and the people who made it. But what is art today, in the twenty-first century, postmodern era? The present accepted definition is, “art is when a person takes any material or substance and uses it to make a statement.” Today, one can take paint, stone, clay, food, newspaper, scraps of metal, wire, cloth, vinyl, egg crates, rubber, or film and use them to make a statement. Anyone who has visited a museum of modern art anywhere in the Western world can attest to the variety of materials being used in unique ways. Like the paintings of the past, postmodern art of the twenty-first century challenges the viewer to think about and analyze what the artist is trying to say. But it may be more demanding than paintings of the past because the viewer may not readily understand the language of an artist who, for instance, uses a few tree branches to make a point.

What distinguishes art from science is that art and creativity are timeless. Science is like a ladder—each year humanity builds upon what it knows and what it has achieved to move forward and upward. When humanity makes progress in science, it usually replaces old techniques and old insights with new ones. Art is only somewhat similar, in that while artists employ techniques that build upon those of their predecessors, viewers do not cease appreciating and finding beauty in what came before. Cave paintings are just as fantastic to behold as a Michelangelo statue, or a Picasso painting, or an Andy Warhol silkscreen of a soup can, or a Frank Gehry piece of architecture. Someone might prefer one style over another, but each is still relevant today and can be appreciated. So with this in mind, why is it important to teach art in school?

Why Is an Art Education Important for Every Child?

Many people do not accept art as an important element in their lives or in the general education of their children. Therefore, there are numerous schools that lack art education, even in the richest and most progressive states.  I am fortunate to teach at a school whose headmaster and administrators value art education, but within many Jewish Day Schools across the country art education is often missing from their curricula. This is always an unfortunate state of affairs, and with budget cutbacks and financial restraints, the problem will only get worse. Therefore it is important to outline a few reasons why every child should have the opportunity of an art education throughout his or her years in school.

I use the term art education to mean a curriculum that combines the teaching of art appreciation and theory with the instruction of hands-on projects—seeing and doing. There are several reasons children benefit from this type of art education. Most broadly, art education can help nurture creativity and critical thinking, which are necessary to excel in a range of disciplines. If people stopped creating or thinking critically, progress in many fields—medicine, engineering, science, or literature would cease. At the same time, art education can encourage healthy risk-taking so that children become comfortable with stepping out of their “comfort zone,” and gain confidence in trying new projects. This ability to come to terms with risk-taking, and sometimes experiencing and recovering from failure, is an important skill-set to learn. Parents who therefore dream of their children becoming doctors or engineers or lawyers should consider that the skills taught in art education can be useful, and critical to, a variety of professional careers.

Aside from benefiting their future professional lives, art education both deepens and broadens children’s understanding of the world around them. Students who take art classes are not only able to appreciate art in museums, they are able comprehend and value the different cultures they come in contact with on a daily basis. Students equipped with this skill are more able to navigate through an increasingly multicultural world and interact intelligently with people of different backgrounds and faiths.

Finally, art education can help improve children’s academic performance. Making art is a uniquely human activity and the making and appreciating art marks an important stage in human intellectual development. In addition, research shows a correlation between studying art and academic achievement. For instance, art education correlated with higher SAT scores, and some studies show that students perform 30 percent better in business when they have taken art classes.[1]

Why Is an Art Education Especially Important in the Jewish Day School Setting?

To make connections.

We marvel at modern-day communication tools; the iPhone, the Internet, Skype, wi-fi, and the digital camera have all facilitated communication and the sharing of ideas. We can be in touch with people living anywhere in the world in a matter of a few seconds. But of course we cannot call or email people who lived years ago. Art is different, as it can put us in touch with civilizations and people that lived thousands of years ago. Art is the voice of what occurred.

Jewish Day School students are especially vested in history, so they can use art to better appreciate their Jewish cultural heritage and see how their forefathers and foremothers lived, as well as get a sense of the other civilizations of the ancient world. The art tells the story. Whether it is an ancient menorah, a ceramic jar, an Assyrian animal carving, an Egyptian tomb painting, a Babylonian ziggurat, or a Greek mosaic, art puts the viewer in direct contact with the past.

To nourish the soul.

How might a student feel when at the Kotel for the first time, or when he or she learns about the horrors of the Holocaust? The history and stories of the Jewish people can certainly open profound as well as unsettling emotions and feelings. In an art class, students can express their feelings and emotions and make a statement through the visual arts.  It is a place where they can incubate their thoughts without the pressure of a test. They can get lost in thought as they make a clay bowl; as they feel the wet clay slip through their fingers, they can find themselves. But it is where they can also explore their values and create a visual image that is reflective of their beliefs and concerns. For example, they can design a poster to express the injustice of the kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit.  Nourishing the soul of a Jewish child has to include the arts as a way of integrating the life cycles, the emotions, the battlefields of Jewish history, and the spiritual meaning of our traditions. It is especially important and is a way of staying connected to Israel as well as the outside world.

To learn respect.

The world is filled with human rights violations, prejudice, discrimination, gender inequality, anti-Semitism, ethnic hatred, and war.  Art curricula can enlighten students both about their own culture, as well as the cultures of the world around them. The advantages of a Jewish education are enormous. But there is a downside to it. Day School students often grow up in an environment that is just like theirs, and they often miss the opportunity to mingle freely with kids from other backgrounds and lifestyles. An art program is a great way to learn about other cultures. This is increasingly important because Jewish people play on the world stage, and so it is essential that they be comfortable with other cultures for business, in politics, and for pleasure. For example, doing a Chinese landscape painting and along the way understanding the origin of this style of painting can help a Jewish Day School student learn about the symbolic meaning of the style and the culture within which it developed. Instead of laughing, which kids normally do when they see something that is bizarre or strange to them, if they have knowledge of what they are looking at, they can begin to respect different cultures. In the end, they will respect themselves as well for being culturally literate. Museum visits with observations and explanations are therefore very important. Worksheets, writing and sketching in the museum are wonderful ways to get children to ask about what they see.

To develop an interest in the aesthetic dimension of life.

Somehow a sense of aesthetics sometimes gets lost in the observant Jewish family tradition. Why? Does a sukkah have to be pre-fab and made of plastic? Does everyone’s wedding invitation have to look similar? Can a menorah be made from copper plumbing parts or fire bricks?  Judaica that is creative not only brings a smile to everyone’s face, but also can make them think more about the mitzvah. Holidays and semahot become more exciting and inspire more reflection when the Judaica is unique. Why does creativity tend to get lost in the tradition? This issue is something that I never quite understood, but is certainly a valid argument for a substantial art program in the Day School setting. There are endless possibilities for new and different ideas while keeping with tradition.

To take risks.

To become a creative person, one has to take risks, come up with new ideas, and have the tenacity to follow through with the creative process. In Jewish Day Schools, taking risks, or trying something different, is often avoided. More broadly, thinking and problem solving is becoming easier to avoid in the age of computer technology. It’s just easier to Google your way from start to finish. What is getting lost, therefore, is the teaching of problem solving and imparting the confidence in students to take risks. It is an especially important skill to have the courage to create something, change it, revise it, critique it and work with it. It doesn’t happen instantly. You have to work it through. That is the nature of the creative process. And you might get a great idea that just doesn’t pan out and that is okay too! It is just as important to learn from mistakes.

A Proposed Art Curriculum in the Jewish Day School

Ideally, if Day School art educators work together, a seamless art curriculum could be developed that would run from grades K–12 and that follows state standard guidelines.

Knowledge and skills would be built on prior experience, but would be revisited allowing for mastery. This is called a spiraling approach. Kids need to be re-exposed to the information and the experience for education and confidence building to work best.  The following are proposed standards, which are based, in part, on some baseline standards set by New York State:

Standard 1: Students should participate in the arts and make works of art that explore different kinds of subject matter, topics, themes, and metaphors. Students will understand and use sensory elements, organizational design principles, and expressive images to communicate their own ideas in works of art.

Standard 2: Students should know and use a variety of visual art materials, techniques, and processes and become aware of the many options and careers in the arts.

Standard 3: Students should respond critically to works of art connecting the individual work to aspects of human thought. They will learn to reflect on, interpret, and evaluate works of art using the language of art criticism.

Standard 4: Students should develop an understanding of the personal and cultural forces that shape artistic communications and how the arts shape the diverse cultures of past and present society. They will explore art and artifacts from world cultures and discover the roles that art plays in the lives of a given time and place. They will use art to understand the social, cultural, and environmental dimensions of human society.

With these standards as a guide and with the limited amount of time for art classes, I would propose the following:

K–2^nd grade: An introduction to the different art materials and techniques, such as painting, sculpting, and printmaking. The emphasis should be on experimentation and exploration. Children should begin to feel confident with the materials. There should be a focus on Jewish themes, such as the holidays. Examples: a clay hannukiyah or a tzedaka box.

3^rd–5^th grade: An introduction to the elements of art, which are line, shape, form, color, value, texture, and space. Basic observational drawing skills and modeling skills should be introduced, as well as an introduction to the work of various artists.  Jewish themes should be used whenever possible. Examples: scenes of Israel painted in acrylic paint on canvas, three-dimensional soft sculpture.

6^th–8^th grade: Design principles should be introduced, such as balance, movement, rhythm, contrast, emphasis, pattern, unity, proportion, and variety. This is the language and grammar of art. Students in middle school should be given the opportunity to delve deeper into the art and culture of other lands as well as learn about the art of the Western world. An overview of the art movements as well as a close study of one of the artists should be explored. Examples: Chinese hand scrolls, hard-edge paintings, Picasso cubist portraits, pop-art paintings, the mosaic and South American rain sticks.

9^th–12^th grade: One unit of art is needed for a high school diploma and the choice is one of the four arts, which include dance, music, drama, or the visual arts. Students who choose fine arts should create a collection of artworks in a variety of media, based on assignments that encourage them to explore various ideas and viewpoints. Teachers should use rubrics for evaluation. College portfolios should be prepared for those students seeking admission to university art schools. Examples of projects: graphic design, lithography, computer graphics, poster design, and experimental sculpture.

Conclusion: To the Source

The center of our Jewish spirituality was the Holy Temple and from the beautiful biblical descriptions we know that there was an emphasis on aesthetics.  As it’s mentioned in the Torah, “Let them make a Holy Shrine that I may dwell amidst them” (Exodus 25:8). The descriptions in this part of the text tell us that the Israelites procured such materials as gold and silver along with fine artisanship, such as weaving, dyeing, and the setting of jewels. The Torah prescribes in detail all the fine materials to be used to build the Temple including the specific measurements and amounts. One could only imagine how beautiful it all was—a true work of art.

In the time of the Temple, Judaism’s expression of faith was fundamentally connected to the arts. And so it should be today as well. There is a concept in Judaism of “hidddur mitzvah”—beautifying the mitzvah. It is praiseworthy to not just fulfill the commandment, but to embellish the mitzvah with additional beauty, so as to express our love and respect for it. It is our responsibility as a community to continue that aesthetic journey with our children so that they may express their faith and so that they can appreciate and participate in the arts throughout their lives. After all, out of the Jewish Day School might come a great architect, industrial designer, fine artist, art teacher, graphic designer, interior designer, curator, art conservationist, art historian, commercial artist, fashion designer, frequent museum visitor, or art collector. Hopefully all of our children armed with a good art education in their Day School years will become lifelong participants in the creative process as well as the future caretakers of all of humanity’s artistic treasures. 

A Ladder upon the Earth, Whose Top Reaches the Heavens[1]

In this article I will attempt to analyze the halakhic approach of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, and to compare and contrast it with two other models of halakhic thought—those of Rabbi Abraham Issac haCohen Kook and Rabbi Isaac Hutner. The central question at the core of these different halakhic approaches is the relationship between halakha and reality; that is, the relationship between the legal source material of preceding generations and the human concerns that arise from the specific question that a posek (halakhic arbiter) is asked. A central prism through which these various approaches may be best understood is their alternative theories of mahloket (talmudic dispute)—a central characteristic of the oral tradition. Over the course of this study, we will explore the way each approach understands the balance between halakha and reality, as well as its relationship to the nature of mahloket.

Rabbi Soloveitchik—Divine Law

In the eulogy for his uncle, Rav Velvele of Brisk (Rabbi Isaac Zev Soloveitchik), ‘Ma Dodekh Mi Dod,’ Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik describes the role reality should play on halakhic pesak through a parable. He compares the real-life circumstances, the difficulties and needs of the individual who asks a halakhic question, to a rocket that launches a satellite into its orbit.   

The halakhic process can be compared to a satellite that enters a particular orbit. The satellite’s entry into orbit depends on its thrust at takeoff. However, once in orbit, it begins to travel with amazing precision according to the specific parameters of its particular orbital path. At this point, its original thrust cannot affect it in the least.[2]

Indeed the rocket propels the satellite into its trajectory; however, once it enters its orbit it continues to travel by the laws of physics. The same is true for the process of pesikah (halakhic decision-making):

The case is the psychological prompt that pushes pure thought into its path. However, once on its path, it [pure thought] pays no deference to the particular case, but operates by its own unique ideal-normative categories.[3]

Even though the posek is dependent upon a question from reality, the process of pesikah itself, the search for an answer to the halakhic question, must be separated from the reality in which the question was asked. The premise of halakhic decision-making is that halakha is based on a set of absolute a priori principles, and as such has no direct or necessary connection with reality. The posek’s role is uncovering the halakhic truth by way of a predetermined course controlled by the principles of the halakhic process.

Professor Avi Sagi summarizes this outlook:

Apparently the closed nature of the system is determined from the fact that it operates as a legal system drawn from predetermined postulates and that it derives its conclusions in consonance with a system of objective rules. Halakha is therefore similar to a deductive system whose fundamental assumptions are the content given from Sinai and its principles are the a priori legal system that also was given at Sinai. The system develops from its own internal axioms on the basis of its own rules, and not on other external factors. Rav Soloveitchik is in fact aware that halakhic ruling is done in relation to the questions that reality itself raises. However, in his opinion, reality is not a component within the halakhic decision itself, rather, it is the motive driving the sages of the halakha to activate the system.[4]

This attitude toward halakhic decision-making greatly influences the place of, and the need for, creativity when making a pesak. It seems to me that Rav Soloveitchik does not deny the fact that pesikat halakha is a process in which the posek compares and connects different sources. For him it is a process through which he creates and adapts halakha to reality and to the new halakhic question that has been asked. Even so, the room for creativity is limited by the predetermined rules that he strives to uphold. In the end, creativity then becomes just a servant to the quest to reveal the halakhic truth. Reality is only an instrument through which the posek is launched into his logical, mathematic-like calculations.

Rabbi Soloveitchik’s fundamental aim is to disconnect halakha from reality and to limit external influences on the halakhic decision-making process.

Why does Rabbi Soliveichik oppose the influence of external realities on pesikah, as described so eloquently in the parable of the rocket? Rav Soloveitchik’s position was expressed on the background of the Haskalah and the historical approach of Zecharia Frankel, which later became the foundation of the Conservative movement. The historical school held that halakha needs to be analyzed through sociological and historical factors to uncover the close connection between these factors and the posek, and the pesikah itself. Emphasizing the influence of the historical reality on pesikah permits one to claim that a certain pesak that was appropriate to an earlier era, is no longer relevant.[5] Since these movements were understood as a threat to Orthodoxy, it seems that Rav Soloveitchik attempted to create a structure of pure halakha, transcending social, cultural, or historical context in order to protect against a complete abrogation of halakha. He therefore strove to disassociate any connection between the halakha and the reality of the questioner.

It seems to me that it is difficult to reconcile Rav Soloveitchik’s attempt to disassociate reality from the halakhic process with the tradition’s attitudes toward halakhic dispute. There are many examples in the tradition of two authorities who faced similar realities and yet came to different and even opposite conclusions. How are we to understand the essence of talmudic dispute and the question of “halakhic truth” that arises from this phenomenon?

The talmudic tradition asserts that in cases of dispute “both these and those are the words of the living God.”[6] This statement can be explained in two ways.[7] The first understands that indeed there are two truths. Both sides of the dispute are actually one hundred percent right. Alternatively, some suggest that there is only one absolutely true halakha that the posek tries with all his might to arrive at and uncover, but there is no guarantee that he will indeed succeed. One side of the dispute is mistaken but nevertheless is afforded the designation of “words of the living God” because of its positive motivation and aspiration to arrive at the truth.

Reconciling either of these understandings of halakhic truth with Rav Soloveitchik’s approach of disassociating reality from halakhic process proves difficult. Let us assume for the moment that Rav Soloveitchik does not accept the literal understanding of “these and those” but opts for the more figurative explanation. This is an approach that claims that the legitimacy of each side lies in its aspiration for truth, not necessarily having reached the absolute truth. Both sides are “the words of the living God,” because both sides are striving for divine truth. The process of searching and striving itself is the divine truth. If we return to the parable of the rocket, there is no guarantee that the posek indeed will manage to enter the proper orbit. It may be that the satellite will never make it into the proper orbit, or maybe at some point it will leave the orbit, and then the gravitational force will overtake the centrifugal force, and the satellite will fall.

The difficulty with this approach is that we are then forced to concede that at least one of the opinions is wrong. One of the posekim did not manage to launch the rocket into the right orbit. This explanation depletes Rav Soloveitchik’s approach of its great strength. He tried to create a paradigm of a priori halakhic truth, and thereby to disassociate halakhic truth from the chains of reality. The moment we acknowledge that posekim may be wrong, we have brought into the process of pesikah the problem of human imperfection with all its ramifications. There may indeed be a “halakhic truth,” but if we never know if we’ve reached it (for the aspiration for truth with no guarantee of its realization is equally applicable in the case of an individual posek as for the body of halakhic disputes), in the end the earthly reality and the human situation prevail over this truth and halakhic decision-making is ultimately dependent on them.

On the other hand, it may be possible to claim that Rav Soloveitchik accepts the other explanation of the nature of dispute in which indeed there are multiple truths. Thus, we can claim that there are a number of different “orbits” that the posek can enter. Each one of them is true in a certain way and provides alternative correct answers to any question that arises.

Yet, it seems that this explanation of dispute is also difficult to reconcile with Rav Soloveitchik’s approach as it provides an opening for the influence of reality on the posek. Ostensibly, reality is only the rocket that causes the take-off,  so how could it influence an entry into an alternative orbit? For every question are there a number of rockets? And even if there indeed are a number of “correct” answers for each question, have we not lost the benefit that we wanted to reap from disassociating halakha from reality? How is the posek to decide among the various options? In the end, there is no escape from the responsibility of the posek to take into account the circumstances and to decide which of the halakhic options best fits them. Indeed, there are multiple mathematic laws that allow for different solutions. Perhaps the axioms themselves don’t change but only their application; be that as it may, this does not remove the central role given to reality itself.

Despite these difficulties in reconciling the nature of rabbinic dispute with his theory of pesikah, it is clear that Rav Soloveitchik prefers that the halakha construct reality, and not vice versa. Halakha is to have the upper hand over reality since it is pure and impervious to human, earthly factors.

Rav Soloveitchik’s approach is best understood in light of his Brisker background. He was completely entrenched in the Bet Midrash, and there seems to be a correlation between his talmudic and his halakhic approaches.

Many of the latter Ashkenazic talmudic authorities spoke of an abstract halakhic world, and attempted to explain disputes in an abstract fashion through the creation of a priori definitions and distinctions that were to be applied to various positions. The most notable among them were the Rogetchover (Rav Yosef Rozin), Rav Yitzchak Yaakov Reines, and Rav Chaim of Brisk. The Rogetchover adopted the philosophic language of the Rambam’s Guide for the Perplexed,[8] Rav Reines spoke using terminology borrowed from the science of Physics,[9] and Rav Chaim adopted terminology from the halakhic literature. In contrast with the first two thinkers, who used terminology foreign to the halakhic discourse, Rav Chaim used notions that were already familiar to the students of halakha, such as shenei dinim, heftza, and gavra (two laws, the object, and the person). He emphasized these concepts and attributed to them major significance, and through them he analyzed the entire halakhic system. He managed to transform the talmudic discussion into an abstract philosophical discussion without resorting to external terminology.[10] You do not need a background from other fields in order to understand his philosophical distinctions, and it seems that for this reason his method caught on in the world of yeshivot. The possibility of analyzing the talmudic discussion in an abstract philosophical manner gave students a sense of elation. Indeed, many times the Brisker method of study is absolutely compelling. Talmudic controversies can be understood as disputes over philosophical principles of a transcendental ideal realm, transforming the halakhic discourse of the Gemara into a debate over ideal principles from which the halakha is drawn.

The advantage of this method is that talmudic study becomes a fascinating philosophical discussion. But it has three significant drawbacks: The first disadvantage, which is recognized in the yeshiva world, is that sometimes its innovative insights simply do not fit the text; the text is exploited to make the abstraction attributed to it. The second problem is that despite the initial interest that such study creates, at some point all the talmudic passages begin to sound alike. There are predetermined arguments the student anticipates. Patterns of thought are repeated until almost all the halakhic discussion is given over to this type of analysis. For each question that arises there is a prepackaged answer. The third problem is the loss of the learner's awareness that the halakhic discussion almost always addresses a human, down-to-earth reality. The sages who dealt with the issues throughout the ages were intimately connected to reality. The discussions in the Talmud are often tied into the experiences, culture, and conceptions of justice of the individuals making their case. The rapid leap to abstraction loses the appreciation for the complexities and alternative explanations of the subject at hand.[11]

We see, therefore, how Rabbi Soloveitchik’s halakhic approach is created from two main focal points. One is the Brisker talmudic approach and the second is the Orthodox need to give a clear answer to antinomian tendencies in the other streams of Judaism. Of course both of these focal points do not stand in isolation from each other, but rather are interconnected to each other. Thus one could speculate that the Brisker method itself grew in part from the need for an Orthodox response to the more liberal forms of Judaism, but this is not for our discussion here.

This presentation of the Brisker background of Rabbi Soloveitchik allows us to focus on one of its substantial dangers. Presenting halakha as disconnected from reality allows for disregard of the circumstances in which a question was posed and a limiting of the options available to halakhic arbiter. In my humble opinion, pesikah is a process in which the posek, sincerely attentive to reality and the human needs arising from it, uses the full gamut of halakhic tools before him to address the question that has arisen. Creativity is at the heart of pesikah, and it allows the posek to connect the sources to reality. Reality is a significant and central factor in the ruling itself and not just a catalyst for the beginning the process.  

Rav Kook: Jewish Law as a Human Creation

In the beginning of his work Lights of the Torah, Rav Kook describes the difference between the Written Torah and the Oral Torah. He says that Divine Law is the Written Torah, and that the Oral Law is a human creation.

We accept the written Torah through the most transcendent channel in our soul... It is not the spirit of the nation that wrought this great light but the spirit of God, the creator of all…

With the oral Torah we descend into more mundane life. We sense that we are receiving the divine light through another channel in the soul, a channel that is closer to earthly life…[12]

However, elsewhere, Rav Kook stresses that Oral Torah is not like any other human creation:

Oral Torah in ensconced in the very nation's character, which found its blessing through Divine revelation of the Written Torah…[13]

Unlike the parable of the satellite of Rabbi Soloveitchik, Rabbi Kook compares the oral tradition to the sail of a ship filled by the wind of the Written Torah—the law of Moses given through the illuminating crystal ball of prophecy. Its dynamism, its direction, and its originality flow from the unique and even divine nation and therein lies its singularity among all other human creations.

From the universal spirit of God, the transcendent spirit of prophecy which creates the eternal Torah of life, comes a spirit of interpretation tucked away in the depths of the soul of the people, revealed in its favorite sons; from its penetrating gaze comes the great riches of the Oral Torah and all its wealth, all its genius and the foundation of its acclimatization to life, and its strength to master life and defeat that which is ugly and degraded in it.[14]

The emphasis is not on a certain quality of the nation that is revealed in the Oral Torah, but rather its ability to create the Oral Law. This capability is an essential and unique feature of the nation

That which Israel has the capacity to create, that is oral Torah...[15]

You can liken the approach of Rav Kook to the difference between a painting by Rembrandt and a painting done by a high school student. Indeed both are human creations, but the difference is that for the artist there is inspiration, some inner aesthetic sense through which he/she is able to create works above and beyond the ability of other people. With regard to the Torah, this uniqueness is with the people Israel. Thus Rav Kook presents a model through which the oral tradition, including the process of pesak, is on the one hand a human process, but on the other this 'humanity' is vested with a special position stemming from its status as the chosen people.

We saw in Rav Soloveitchik that halakha is basically a divine fixed system of rules, and its study and even pesikah are influenced by its nature. In contrast, for Rav Kook all of the Oral Torah, including the halakha, is a human creation based on the divine Written Torah. If Rav Soloveitchik understands reality as a stimulus to search for the absolute divine truth, for Rav Kook halakha is a human creation of a nation endowed with a special genius for the creation of an oral Torah out of its historical experience.

Such an approach, that sees the essence of halakha as a creation flowing from the nation, can be found in the thought of Ahad Ha'am. In his article "Torah of the Heart,” he talks about the heart that beats through halakha over the generations. Although he had an ambivalent attitude toward tradition, he nevertheless anticipated a renaissance of Jewish law. He felt that there was narrowing of halakha in his generation, but looked forward to the day that the Jewish heart would beat again and create halakhot in an appropriate fashion. His approach can be best understood through his presentation of the talmudic determination that the statement “eye for an eye” should be understood as monetary compensation:

…If the heart in its development reached the understanding that “an eye for an eye” is an unacceptable cruelty for a cultured nation, and the heart was still at that time the absolute authority—then it is clear that the other source of authority, scripture, could not mean anything else, and there is no doubt, therefore, that “an eye for an eye” means monetary compensation.[16]

Rav Kook echoes Achad Ha’am in his attribution of halakha as an amazing human creation of the Jewish people; yet, there is a certain difference between them. Achad Ha’am writes critically of the state of halakha in his time. He laments that halakha has deteriorated, and he therefore calls for a halakhic renaissance.[17] Against this, Rav Kook writes in a gentler fashion. He does not believe that at some point in the development of the oral tradition the system broke down; rather, he accepts the Oral Torah of the generations as is and marvels at its beauty.

One could ask about Rav Kook's approach, what is the relationship between the Oral Torah of the current generation and previous generations? Is one to accept the creation of every generation as legitimate? What is the value of the current generation’s creation in light of the beauty and validity of the work previously existing for many generations, which is also a manifestation of all the special character of Israel from time immemorial? It seems that in some sense Rav Kook loses the ability to critically evaluate the sources of Oral Torah. If halakha is a masterpiece, can one suggest that it is not appropriate for a certain reality? And what happens in a generation where the national spirit turns in a negative direction that one should oppose? It seems that the critical sense is something fundamental to Oral Torah that expresses itself through the talmudic tradition of dispute. Oral Torah is not a unified harmonious creation but rather a compilation of numerous positions that disagreed and critiqued each other.

It should be noted that the theoretical differences between Rav Kook and Rav Soloveitchik do not affect their actual halakhic decision-making. On the one hand, from an examination of Rav Kook's response, he seems very similar to other posekim. There seems to be little direct influence on his pesak from his conception of Oral Torah. On the other hand, from testimony about Rav Soloveitchik’s rulings in the Boston community and at Yeshiva University, it appears that he was flexible and especially attentive to reality. Nevertheless, in the next generation the influence of Rav Soloveitchik’s understanding of the process of halakhic decision-making becomes recognizable. Posekim emanating from his circles tend to discuss little of the character of the circumstances and its complexity, and jump too quickly to apply a priori halakhic concepts. The idea that halakha is something transcendent and pure, affects all of the Orthodox circles in America—and a portion of the Conservative movement as well. The most striking point is that the posek generally does not deal with reality itself, but only with the reality as compared to the transcendent Law; i.e., how the transcendent law applies to the reality before him.

Rav Hutner—Halakha as a Conversation between Heaven and Earth

In contradistinction to Rav Soloveitchik and Rav Kook, who ignore the dimension of time in the transmission of Torah from generation to generation, Rav Yitzchak Hutner emphasizes the process of the transmission of the Torah received at Sinai from generation to generation. His approach is expressed in a number of places in his series of books on the holidays entitled Pahad Yitzchak, but the core of his understanding of halakha can be found in essays 1 and 3 of his volume on Hanukkah.

In essay 1, he presents an idea that there is something unique about the style of the Oral Torah that is indicative of its essence. He expresses this idea in his usual fashion through a spectacular homiletic in which he goes through various sources and explains them in creative ways.

Rav Hutner bases his approach on three sources. The first is a Tosafot in Tractate Gittin from which he learns that the translation of the Oral Torah into foreign languages would cause the Jewish people to lose its uniqueness:

The Midrash states: "they will be considered foreign" for the gentiles wrote (translated) the Torah. If all of the Torah had been written down for Israel, the gentiles would have written (translated) all of it. Therefore, the Merciful one said, "I will write for him most of the Torah, for what I wrote for them, is considered foreign, since foreigners copied it.[18]

In this puzzling midrash, the Sages say that God intentionally refrained from writing the Oral Torah in order to prevent non-Jews from translating it. Were they to acquire it through translation, Israel would lose its uniqueness. The rabbis of the midrash claim that God knew that non-Jews would translate the Torah and therefore commanded that the Oral Torah should not be written. For the purpose of Israel maintaining its uniqueness, the Oral Torah was not written. Rav Hutner connects this midrash to the statement of Rabbi Yohanan who says that the essence of the chosenness of Israel is the Oral Torah:

R. Yohanan said: God only made a covenant with Israel for the sake of the matters that were transmitted orally.[19]

The third source for Rav Hutner is the Vilna Gaon's commentary on the blessings of the Torah:

“Who chose us from all the nations,” “who gave us his Torah” ... “who gives the Torah.” He wrote in the abovementioned book of the GR”A (The Gaon Rabbi Eliyahu of Vilna) that this blessing has three parts corresponding to the three times Israel accepted the Torah: When God said "you shall be my treasured possession" (Exodus 19:5), they accepted all the commandments, and the second time, at the revelation of Sinai, and third, when Moses made the covenant. Thus, all three occasions are referenced in this blessing: "who chose us" refers to "you shall be my treasured possession," "who gave us his Torah" refers to the revelation at Sinai when they received the Torah from God, and "who gives the Torah" with the definite article, refers to the Oral Torah which they received from Moses orally. Therefore, it is written in present tense, "who gives" because knowledge of the Oral Torah constantly renews knowledge.[20]

Despite the emphasis of the GR”A that the Oral Torah is the third link in the threefold giving of the Torah, Rav Hutner processes his words against their simple meaning and claims that the essence of the Oral Torah predates the chosenness of Israel and the giving of the Torah. The uniqueness of Israel, as expressed in God's proclamation that Israel will be “treasured to Me,” is dependent on the Oral Torah being unique to the nation, but had the Oral Torah been translated, Israel's uniqueness, and treasured status would be abrogated retroactively.

In this surprising explanation, Rav Hutner further claims that this fundamental aspect, which is part of the nature of the Oral Torah, already existed before the giving of the Torah, during the period of the Patriarchs, and before the content of the Oral Torah was revealed.

And because the covenant includes the repudiation of writing down the oral tradition, it follows that the prohibition of, "you are not permitted to write down the teachings of the Oral Torah" precedes all the specific prohibitions of the Torah, and moreover, it precedes the very event of the revelation of Torah.[21]

This is astonishing! On the one hand, this fundamental predates even the giving of the Torah, but on the other hand it is embodied specifically in the Oral Torah. This begs the question, what is this foundation and what is the significance of the fact that it was established before the giving of the Torah? It appears that Rav Hutner was not referring to any halakhic content that was given at Sinai but rather to something more essential and fundamental.

We will put aside for the moment the question of what this fundamental is, and turn to essay number three on Hanukkah. In this essay, Rav Hutner claims that ever since the Torah was given at Sinai, parts of it were forgotten from generation to generation. But God actually rejoices over this loss because in its wake, people attempt to restore the Torah which causes it to expand. How is it that forgetfulness causes an expansion of Torah? On the simplest level, the logical arguments through which we succeed in regaining the lost halakha is the Torah that is reproduced.

We learn from here a wonderful novel idea that it is possible for the Torah to grow in consequence of it being forgotten to the extent that it is possible to receive congratulations for forgetting Torah. See that the Sages state that three hundred halakhot were forgotten in the days of mourning for Moses, but were restored by Otniel ben Kenaz through his casuistry. The logical arguments and the restoration of halakhot, these are the words of Torah that expand only through the forgetting of Torah.[22]

Moreover, in radical way, the pilpul (logical argumentation) causes the creation of totally new halakhic positions. It is possible that the Sages did not “succeed” in their attempt to discover the original halakha that was since forgotten. We see that there are arguments regarding the correct halakha, and this indicates multiple reconstructions of the halakha by various Sages. This point is expressed in the ability of a rabbinic court to rely on a minority opinion that was rejected in the past and rule accordingly, a fact that indicates its legitimacy:

The even bigger novel insight that flows from this understanding is that Oral Torah’s extraordinary strength is more evident in cases of difference of opinion than in cases of unanimity. For embedded within the statement “these and those are the words of the living God” is the principle that even an opinion that was rejected by halakha is a legitimate Torah opinion.

…And if a latter vote is taken and they decide to accept the previously rejected opinion, from then on, the halakha genuinely changes.[23]

What is the content of those halakhot that were regenerated in the wake of forgetfulness, and what is the relationship between them and the original, forgotten halakhot? Rav Hutner suggests that “new Torah values” that may even be contrary to the original values are created.

The war of Torah (the creation of disputed positions) is not simply another characteristic of Torah study. Rather the war of Torah is a positive creation of new Torah values that would not otherwise be found in the words of Torah themselves.

The advantage of forgetfulness is the creation of new opinions that would not have been created otherwise. When the sages of Torah accept an opinion that was rejected in the past, it becomes the halakhic precedent. In extreme circumstances it is possible that a halakha will be accepted that expresses the very opposite of the original halakha, and nevertheless, it will become the true and accepted halakha. This process is not a negative one, but on the contrary, it receives God’s approbation who declares, “Yasher Koach (congratulations) that you broke them.” It seems that Rav Hutner understood how radical his words were, and therefore he emphasized:

The approach rejected from Halakha remains a legitimate Torah opinion, as long as it is said within the boundaries of the discourse of the Oral Torah.[24]

It is possible to understand the forgetting that Rav Hutner speaks of in a straightforward fashion—that in the past we knew what to do in a particular situation, but today we don't anymore. Yet it seems clear that Rav Hutner refers to not only the forgetting of technical halakhic details, but also to a more essential forgetting. Throughout the article, he claims that forgetfulness is an ongoing phenomenon of the Oral Torah and continues even after the writing of the Oral Torah that ostensibly prevents technical forgetfulness. Therefore we need to expand the notion of forgetfulness to include situations in which the reality has changed and we find it difficult to apply the previous halakhic precedent as it stands. A hint to this idea can be found in his quotation from Nachmanides where he says that “it is known that not all minds will be in agreement over how to address new situations.”[25] According to Nachmanides, halakhic disputes are the result of attempts by imperfect sages to apply the divine Torah to new realities.

Rav Hutner speaks about forgetfulness in its usual sense, but he is also referring to something similar to, yet beyond forgetting—that is the quandary that we experience when upon first glance we do not know how to apply the halakha in a given reality. He calls it “darkness-forgetfulness,” where the darkness is a type of confusion: when we don't know what to do; we feel as if we are standing in the dark.

It is from this perspective of forgetting that one should understand the reconstruction of lost halakha. This is a process in which the posek tries to apply anew the halakha to reality. He tries to compare the situation at hand to a myriad of sources, to innovate out of those sources and thereby resolve the difficulty. The halakhic sources reach us through a long tradition, whose origin can be traced to the acceptance of the Torah at Sinai and afterwards through the cycles of forgetfulness and restoration of these sources. The posek continues to engage in a conversation with the sources, through which he formulates his new ruling. These rulings are the essential and main benefits of forgetfulness that forces the posek to create and innovate.

What is the deeper significance of a conversation with things that were revealed at Sinai and what is the importance of entering into this conversation? To understand this point we will return to essay number one and to the “secret fundemental” that still needs to be uncovered.

I suggested as a solution to the puzzle of essay 1 that the foundation (or “secret”) of the Oral Torah is the dialogue and give and take that the posek establishes between the present situation and past sources. This process is like a tug-of-war between the posek and those sources. The Aramaic words shakla vetarya, translated as give-and-take, are the talmudic terminology for this process of matching the sources to the reality. This same phrase is also used as the term for bargaining. There is a process of bargaining between the human needs on the one hand and the authority of the sources on the other. Sometimes we submit before the authority of the source, but other times we reinterpret a source so that our conclusion will fit with the given reality. In essay 3, Rav Hutner emphasizes over and again the “battle of Torah,” and it seems that he is referring specifically to the talmudic dialogue, of which an essential part is argument and constant debate.

This grand conversation predates the giving of the Torah and it is, in essence, the ethos that our forefathers bequeathed to us for all future generations. The Patriarchs engaged in dialogue with God Himself for the welfare of His creations. An outstanding example of this is the conversation between Abraham and God before the destruction of Sodom. The interchange between Abraham and God could very well be described as bargaining; while God suggests he will utterly destroy Sodom, Abraham bargains suggesting that God should save the city if 50, then 45, then 40, etc., righteous individuals can be found. We can say that Abraham may have been the first to engage in “shakla vetarya” with the divine word. Perhaps this is an indication of the aspect of Oral Torah that predates its giving that Rav Hutner was referring to. But it is not just Abraham who looks to engage God in dialogue. It seems that God is anticipating and encouraging just this type of engagement. God asks, “Shall I conceal from Abraham what I am about to do?”[26] He continues, “for I have come to know him because he will instruct his sons and household after him to guard the way of the Lord to do righteousness and justice.”[27] From a simple reading of the text it seems that God expected Abraham to argue with Him. God revealed His plan to Abraham specifically because He knew that Abraham instructs his household to do “righteousness and justice” and thus will not let Him destroy Sodom. So in addition to the ethos that Abraham creates when he stands before God in argument, God too creates this ethos and expects it from Abraham.

Like our Patriarchs, we, in every generation, stand before the formal commandment of God and adopt the ethos of dialogue in the story of Sodom, a dialogue that seeks the welfare of humanity. We stand before the divine commandment and declare that it is up to us to try to interpret it in a way that is attentive to reality and human adversity. It is incumbent upon us to engage in this give and take for the welfare of all creatures. God encourages this dialogue. Through the story of Sodom, God explains to us how to accept His Torah.[28]

This intimate conversation that is maintained between Israel and God is the unique aspect of the Oral Torah. Its uniqueness stems from its intimacy—there is much love and intimacy in true debate.[29] The acceptance of the Torah is indeed absolute, a complete commitment. Yet at the same time, it is like a student’s acceptance of his teacher’s wisdom. The student poses difficult questions, engages in a give and take that creates an intimate relationship.

In other words, when a posek tries to restore what was at Sinai, he tries to restore what should have been. Sometimes he’s not quite sure what was said at Sinai and stands bewildered by the simple application of the words that were said to the given reality. But he knows what should have been said at Sinai based on the principle of “to guard the way of the Lord to do righteousness and justice.” Indeed, this principle speaks of interpersonal commandments; yet it is also applicable to commandments between humans and God.[30]

Halakha is an attempt to make a better world of human relations and the relations between God and humanity. Were we to try to create such a world from whole cloth, we would lose out on two accounts: first we would lose the intensity of the ethical activity and the religious adherence that stems from halakhic commitment; additionally, we would lose out on the intimacy of the dialogue with God. This dialogue is also a conversation with all those who previously engaged God in conversation. A chain of generations is in dialogue with the divine command as we attempt to apply it to reality—each generation with its own circumstances—in the best way possible.

This conversation is important, not for that sake of the debate itself, but for the attainment of love through dialogue and exchange. The joy in a shared creation is what brings love. The deep meaning of learning Torah is the conversation with God. Sometimes this conversation is not direct, but through the Torah of one who dealt with an issue in a previous generation. Nevertheless, through this conversation we feel an intimacy with God in all of His glory. The result of this intimacy is a halakha that fits the reality, is attentive, and desires to “guard the way of the Lord to do righteousness and justice.”

Against the polar opposite approaches of Rav Soloveitchik and Rav Kook—a completely heavenly halakha or a halakha that is a wholly human creation—we can view the approach of Rav Hutner as the “middle road” that creates a dialogue between the approaches, between heaven and earth, in order to find the best way to maintain the divine command in the current reality.

An Orthodox colleague recently created a controversy after writing a blog post explaining why he no longer recites the blessing shelo asani isha - thanking God for not creating him as a woman. Several Orthodox rabbis criticized this position for various reasons with one even questioning the author's right to call himself "Orthodox," ostensibly for deviating from the traditional liturgy through his omission. In the grand scheme of Orthodox Jewish history this rabbi's personal choice is relatively trivial. However, in the subsequent squabbling over one rabbi's legitimacy, the Orthodox rabbinate inadvertently exposes the inherent cognitive dissonance prevalent in the contemporary Orthodox community.

Contemporary Orthodox Judaism tends to resist innovation and change as a matter of principle. Preserving the authentic tradition is the highest priority, especially when faced with potentially corrupting external influences. For just one example, when confronted with the question of mixed seating in the synagogues, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik exhorted the Rabbinical Council of America to "be ready to fight for an undiluted Halachah which is often not in the vogue."¹ The problem of course is that Jewish history is replete with exactly such instances when common Jewish practice has changed, either through adapting existing practice or introducing new innovations.

Consider one such example from the liturgy. In the section of morning blessings, the same part of the service which includes shelo asani isha - virtually all sidduim contain the blessing ha-notein la'ya'ef koach - blessing God for giving strength to the weak. R. Yosef Karo (1488-1575) opposed not only the recitation of this blessing (O.H. 46:6), but the legitimacy of its very existence stating, "since it is not mentioned in the Talmud, I do not know how this person had permission to create it" (Beit Yosef O.H. 46:6). The difference between omitting a blessing and reciting an unauthorized one is substantial; in the former one only does not fulfill a rabbinic obligation (T. Berachot 6:18) but in the latter instance one violates a biblical prohibition of taking God's name in vain (Shemot 20:6, B. Berachot 33a). And yet for contemporary Judaism, one such liturgical change is accepted if not required, while the other is deemed unorthodox.

The methods of how Orthodox Judaism selectively incorporates or rejects changes is beyond the scope of this essay. However, there is a more fundamental question which can be extremely uncomfortable for most traditional Orthodox Jews: are the boundaries and definitions for acceptable Orthodox Judaism objective or subjective? Based on the sanctimony emanating from Orthodox Judaism it would be reasonable to assume the former. But if there are objective criteria for Orthodox Judaism, then this criteria must not only be defined and defended explicitly, but more importantly applied consistently to every instance. This would mean that even well established "traditional" opinions or rabbis who violate this criteria would have to be held accountable to this standard, and perhaps be reconsidered as beyond the scope of Orthodox Judaism.

On the other hand, if the criteria for Orthodox Judaism is subjective, meaning it is a floating target meant to include or exclude as a need arises, then Orthodox Judaism is as arbitrary as the other denominations which they criticize. Despite the rhetoric of preserving Torah, if the criteria is subjective, then Orthodox Judaism is so only because its adherents say so.

To paraphrase John Adams, the question which Orthodox Jews must inevitably confront is if it is a religion of laws or of men. If the former, then the laws must be applied universally to exclude that which violates it and to accept that which falls within its range of acceptability, regardless of a an individual's stature or affiliation. But if Orthodox Judaism is primarily defined by its community, then the arbitrariness would be justified, albeit at the expense of its alleged adherence to being shomerei Torah.

This question must be addressed by anyone who ventures into the debate as to what qualifies as "Orthodox Judaism." But from my own experience I have found that the Law provides its own answer and the Men provide theirs.

1. Soloveitchik, Joseph B. "Message to a Rabbinic Convention." The Sanctity of the Synagogue The Case for Mechitzah: Separation Between Men and Women in the Synagogue Ed. Baruch Litvin Ktav 1987. p. 109

When Rabbi Marc Angel asked me to write an article for this issue of Conversations, an issue dedicated to a consideration of Orthodoxy and the State of Israel, I saw both challenge and opportunity.¹

Having watched and quietly cheered on Rabbi Angel’s efforts over the past several decades to help guide the world of the Orthodox rabbinate back toward its historic embrace of halakha as a dynamic, living, foundational force in Jewish life, and having established in my personal observance an approach toward praxis,² which some might consider post-denominational, I approached this article with a degree of trepidation, coupled with respect and anticipation. I spent several months consulting with friends and colleagues who share with me a liberal Jewish religious perspective and who have also made the sacred choice of aliya. These individuals are listed for informational purposes at the close of the article,³ but none of them bear any responsibility for the thoughts that I express or the conclusions that I reach. Such thoughts and such conclusions are solely my own.

A moment in time: Several years ago, I was sitting with two colleagues in the lobby of Jerusalem’s Crowne Plaza Hotel. We were tasked with putting together a tri-denominational program about life in Israel for a community event back in the United States. There we sat, drinking coffee, discussing our shared passion for the Atlanta Braves, crafting our approach to a program that would necessarily allow our religious differences to be visible. We determined that we would be honest, even as we would choose not to be confrontational. An Orthodox, a Conservative, and a Reform rabbi, all olim, could publicly demonstrate our love for Medinat Yisrael without making our conversation a zero sum game.

One of us mused: “If only a photographer from Yediot could capture this moment.” Three veteran rabbis with clearly different and strongly held religious convictions, sitting together in public, were comfortably discussing a community event in which we would respectfully and honestly enter into a public dialogue. And we felt that we were doing nothing extraordinary, because we all had come from an American culture in which such encounters are not all that unusual. But in Israel, our meeting might well have warranted front page coverage simply because local expectations here have become so vastly different.

A moment in time: On Rosh haShanah5771, we attended services with our family in suburban Westchester County, New York. The rabbi of our daughter’s Reform congregation announced that just one week ago he had received a call from the rabbi of a neighboring Young Israel congregation, with a warm invitation for the two communities to come together for a shared Tashlih service. Later that afternoon, the two rabbis conducted a beautiful joint sacred occasion in the presence of large representations from both communities, an occasion within which ahdut (unity) was embraced as an aspect ofteshuvah (repentance). We all understood that such moments did not occur regularly anywhere in the world. But the relaxed atmosphere testified eloquently to the reality that our worshiping together fit the broad parameters of that which is possible, acceptable, and even desirable within American expectations.

One of the most daunting challenges confronting many liberal Jews living in the State of Israel today is the overwhelming feeling that we share the most dismal of expectations about relationships between and among the various Jewish religious communities. Of course there are exceptions, but far too often we find negative expectations validated and reconfirmed by deeply troubling personal or public encounters. Those events unavoidably color and shape the manner in which we perceive and interact with each other; they become the fuel for self-fulfilling prophecies which cannot help but threaten the health of Israeli society and the viability of the Jewish state.

A moment in time: On the very day of our aliya, my wife Resa and I sat before the desk of the final pakkid on the second floor of the old terminal at Ben Gurion airport. Due to the intifada that still raged, we were the only olim being processed that day. The official, as he stamped our documents, conversationally asked Resa about her profession. She told him of her advanced degree in statistics and he nodded his head in appreciation. Then it was my turn. I told him in Hebrew that I was a Reform rabbi. He stopped, adjusted his kippah, and literally spat as he said: “You are no rabbi.” Welcome home to Israel, the paradigmatic setting for the pain and beauty of Jewish life.

Even as I write this essay (in October 2010), the Knesset remains embroiled in a bitter debate over the future of MK Rotem’s conversion bill. Most of us are profoundly concerned about the fate of the religious identities of some 350,000 Russian olim (and now their more than 90,000 children born in Israel). The Rotem bill as originally proposed probably would have offered some small degree of relief to what I view as the obstructionism and insularity of the Chief Rabbinate and of the bloated religious establishment regarding conversion, but amendments to the bill had introduced elements that managed to outrage members of the Diaspora Jewish community, including a number of key Orthodox leaders living outside of Israel. The Rotem bill has become yet another setting within which ties among various Orthodox and Hareidi establishments and those who wield political power in the state are being used to severely disadvantage the clear majority of Israelis who choose not to see themselves as part of those establishments. Inevitably, the dangerous psychological and spiritual distancing between Diaspora Jewry and Israel is intensified.

Expectations grow ever bleaker.

Other moments in time: I stood as a witness to the Shabbat afternoon parking lot battles near the Jaffa Gate. I personally heard the racist slurs crudely hurled by some Hareidi men at uniformed Ethiopian olim. I seethed as young Israeli police were called grotesque epithets dredged up from out of our people’s Shoah nightmare. I marched in protest over the arrest of women who dared to treat the plaza fronting the Kotel as a national shrine open to all Israelis, rather than as an exclusionary ultra-Orthodox synagogue. I counseled my kibbutz cousin’s children who had invited me to officiate at their weddings to “do the right thing” by going to Europe first to get “legally” married, since my more than 45 years of service to the Jewish people as a rabbi mean nothing in an Israel that has chosen to trade true pluralistic democracy for political expediency and religious hegemony, principle for power and funding. I comforted a woman colleague who had been slapped across the face by a dati woman who sought to punish her for raising her voice during Hallel as she stood near the Kotel.  

Expectations.

The descriptors (more often privately than publicly expressed) that emerge out of such declining expectations are, not surprisingly, bitter. Those descriptors, as expressed to me by most of those with whom I consulted, include but are not limited to words and phrases such as “abomination,” “nightmare,” “anachronistic,” “ridiculous,” “moral violence,” “absurd and grotesque,” “medieval,” “sinat hinam,” and “extortion.” These are responses to how some of us in Israel see our lives impacted by those Orthodoxies politically empowered and fundamentally corrupted by government.

The pain is real. Many of us who lovingly and out of deep ideological conviction chose aliya find ourselves emotionally torn. Not one would even consider abandoning our dream of being part of our people’s national re-birth, but the price—a serious price that we had originally reckoned in terms of family separation and financial limitation—now far too often also includes emotionally draining battles against efforts to delegitimize us, to marginalize us, to exclude us from mainstream communal life.

Research and advocacy groups such as “HIDDUSH—Freedom of Religion for Israel”⁴ regularly demonstrate with verifiable accuracy wide dissatisfaction among a broad spectrum of the Israeli electorate with the current status of formal and informal state/synagogue ties in Israel. Tension between so-called secular Israelis and the various Orthodox establishments in Israel are viewed by many today as the single most serious source of societal dis-ease.

A. B. Yehoshua’s writings often portray contemporary Jews as living permanently with a kind of divided personality. We Jews whose homes are in Israel are pathologically unable to be comfortable in Zion, yearning instead for the openness of a non-coercive, expansive, anonymous Diaspora. But those of us who dwell in the Diaspora are equally unable to be comfortable there, yearning instead for the richness and integrity of Jewish communal and personal life in Israel. Wherever we Jews are, there is always somewhere else where we would rather be. My personal psychological imbalance is somewhat different: I am comfortable in Israel, relishing the opportunity to live a full and wonderfully rich and satisfying Jewish life here, even as I work hard with so many others to try to disestablish the Chief Rabbinate, to separate out all formal ties linking the religious councils with government, to grant to all religious streams the right to conduct life-cycle events for those who are their adherents, and to permit and encourage those who embrace that unique phenomenon known as Israeli secularism to create their own meaningful rituals and celebrations without coercion or discrimination.

Resa and I have chosen to live in Jerusalem not just because most of the major international Reform organizations are represented here, but because our souls feel firmly rooted and nourished by Jerusalem’s air, by its history, by its promise. We have chosen to live in Jerusalem because of its endless opportunities to study with great scholars and to immerse ourselves in a richly variegated Jewish culture. But we are forced to confront daily and to struggle endlessly with those who would drain from that air the soul-sustaining oxygen of choice, who opt for coercion over conversation, who view loyalty to Torah as requiring an end to that eilu veEilu wrestling with text that had previously endowed the Jewish people with a vast storehouse of spiritual richness, who prefer fossilization to diversity within the halakhic process, and who have intentionally diverged from 2,000 years of religious teachers who had trusted the Jewish people in its pursuit of fidelity to the One.

One colleague pointed out that many of us are “anomalies” within Israeli society. We consider ourselves to be religious; but we are not dati’im. We maintain kosher homes; we observe festivals; we attend worship regularly; so we cannot be considered by others as hilonim. We feel that our chosen presence in Israel as citizens-by-choice is the result of a sacred act of aliya; but most of us are willing to support those who would cede sovereignty over parts of Erets Yisrael, if by so doing we insure the security and domestic well-being of Medinat Yisrael. Are we then religious Zionists, or are we not? Many of us are strong advocates of church/state separation in the United States, but accept the rationale calling for equitable state funding of ALL Jewish religious streams in Israel. Are we then religious liberals or conservatives? Many of us oppose what appears to be the ever-increasing Kotel-olatry that strongly interferes with our Jewish efforts (as per Heschel) to create palaces in time but not in space; yet we will battle ceaselessly against those who deny women the right to worship and to read Torah at the Kotel.

I know that all of the above means that we Israeli Jews must now struggle to create a polity that has never before existed: a truly democratic, pluralistic Jewish state strongly protective of the rights of all its minorities (including but not restricted to women, Arabs, immigrants, foreign workers, refugees, Jews by Choice, Reform and Conservative and Reconstructionist and secular/humanist Jews, gays and lesbians), infused with profound respect for and support of Jewish life in the Diaspora. Those personal inner divisions require me to strongly respect the achievements of Israel’s Orthodoxies as they rebuild a world of study and observance that was almost annihilated, that has produced great Rabbis and Hakhamim such as Rav A. I. Kook and Rabbi Ben Zion Uziel, and that made certain that Israel’s founders would not succeed in diminishing the presence of Shabbat and Hagim in the public sphere—even as I battle against government funding for private Torah-based schools that refuse to teach tokhnit haLiba in their curriculum (the government-mandated core secular curriculum, compliance with which impacts the degree of direct government funding for various school systems. The evolving content of this curriculum is a source of ongoing political and ideological struggle), who inculcate within their students the view that Torah law trumps civil law when it comes to national defense, who speak of those who disagree with their teachings as lacking in full Jewish identity, who regard tolerance of diversity as an intolerable sign of weakness, or who embrace mitzvoth bein adam laMakom to the often total exclusion of mitzvoth bein adam leHaveiro.

The future is not fixed, but then again neither is the past.⁵ As we make those choices that will define our present and texture our future, we come to shape, understand and validate our past. As for me, I am in love with Zion, but I am most certainly not at ease with Zion. I embrace the zekhut of living at such a time that I might contribute to the shaping of Israeli society, to help complete the process of the rebirth of the Jewish state. It is still possible to reverse the spiraling descent of our expectations regarding relationships among all of Israel’s religious streams and thus it is still possible to bring into the Israeli mainstream expectations of cooperation and mutual respect. It is still possible to strengthen the voices of the Israeli majority interested in crafting a pluralistic Jewish democracy. And it is still possible to build a Jewish homeland which will be compellingly attractive to my American grandchildren.

To everything there is a time. That time is now.

Notes

1.  It is relevant to note that I am a Reform rabbi, 71 years of age, who (together with my wife and life partner, Resa) made aliya from Atlanta, Georgia, on February 22, 2004. Our home is in Jerusalem. Our children and grandchildren all reside within the United States. They visit us, we visit them, and among us we gratefully support video cams, Skype, magicJack and a variety of Frequent Flyer programs. Through their parents’ choices, some of our grandchildren attend the Modern Orthodox Bi-Cultural Day School in Stamford, Connecticut, while others attend the Wilshire Boulevard Temple’s Reform Day School in Los Angeles. I am the immediate past president of the Association of Reform Zionists of America (ARZA) and a past chair of the National Rabbinic Cabinet of State of Israel Bonds. Currently I sit on the Board of Governors of the Jewish Agency, the Hanhallah of the World Zionist Organization, and the Board of Overseers of the Jerusalem Campus of the Hebrew Union College. Resa is on the Board of ARZENU and on the Board of the Women of Reform Judaism, where she holds the Israel portfolio; she has created more than 22 affiliates of the Women of Reform Judaism in Israel over the past two years.
2. Typically, for example, I pray Erev Shabbat at Kol HaNeshama (Reform) and on Shabbat morning at Shira Hadasha (egalitarian modern Orthodox). Twice monthly I study the Sfat Emet on Shabbat before Shaharit. I am drawn to the Kotel on Tisha B’Av, but only then. I regularly study at the Shalom Hartman Institute. I cannot imagine a more personally satisfying arrangement.
3. I express my gratitude to the following colleagues and friends whose thoughtful comments were of enormous benefit to me in the writing of this article. As noted above, I bear sole and complete responsibility for all of the views expressed: Rabbi Stacey Blank; Rabbi Shelton Donnell; Rabbi Shaul Feinberg; Rabbi Stuart Geller; Rabbi Miri Gold; Terry Cohen Hendin; Rabbi Richard Hirsch; Rabbi Naamah Kelman; Rabbi Richard Kirschen; Michael Nitzan; Dr. Barry Knishkowy, Rabbi Joel Oseran; Rabbi Henry Skirball; Matthew Sperber.
4. For the sake of full disclosure, I sit on the HIDDUSH steering committee.
5.  Alan Watts and others.

When we moved to Israel 30 years ago we sacrificed a number of things: living space (we exchanged a two-story home on a large plot of land for an apartment in a 10-story building) and the excellent, affordable, and personal medical care to which middle-class Americans had then grown accustomed. We also lost Sundays as days off.

What we gained made this all worthwhile: a sense of purpose, a sense of being part of something important that was bigger than ourselves, and, we thought, the opportunity finally to be part of the mainstream.

How did things work out? Rather differently than expected. Israel has grown much more prosperous over the years (if we did not mind the commute, we could sell our large apartment in Haifa and move to a lovely home in the Galilee); medical care here has improved dramatically, while the level of care for middle-class Americans has gone down and the price has gone up, both dramatically. Jewish education here remains problematic, but it is certainly not bankrupting parents, as it is in North America. The five-day week has reached Israel (when it was first proposed to the late Levi Eshkol he is reputed to have said: “First let’s see if we can get people to work for four days, before stretching it to five.”)—with Fridays replacing America’s Sundays as part of the weekend.

Two things particularly surprised us: we raised children with Israeli manners, and we certainly did not become part of the mainstream. Both of us grew up in rabbinical homes, with fathers active in Mizrahi and both fathers and mothers deeply involved in Jewish education, seeing all of the Jewish people as their responsibility. We assumed that we would find like-minded communities here in Israel. That did not turn out to be the case. Over the years we have lived here, the National Religious Party (Mafdal), the Israeli branch of the World Mizrahi, engaged in a long drawn-out act of suicide. No longer seeing itself as appealing to and seeking to represent all Jews, Ashkenazi and Sefardi, dati and non-dati, it first turned itself into the party of Orthodox Zionists, and, after the rise of Shas, into a party of Orthodox Ashkenazi Zionists; it then turned its gaze even further inward and turned itself into the party of the Orthodox Ashkenazi Zionist Settlers. It has now transmogrified into the extreme right-wing “Bayit Yehudi” party with three members of K’nesset (one of whom we know personally and admire as an individual), two of whom basically speak to each other only through the third.

One of us was here in 1967 as a volunteer on a border kibbutz before, during, and after the war and we both initially shared the widespread enthusiasm for settling the territories occupied during the war. After moving here in 1980, we more and more came to realize the folly of seeking to hold on to the “Greater Land of Israel” and drifted leftward politically, putting us out of synch with our neighbors, with most of our friends from synagogue, and, significantly, with the B’nei Akiva youth movement, to which our children belonged. Israel is a society of clearly defined groupings, with clear labels. We often had the sense that in the eyes of many of our fellow synagogue-goers, political “deviance” was a reflection of religious “deviance.” So much for becoming part of the mainstream!

Another issue that distanced us ideologically (if rarely personally) from our friends and neighbors was our growing discomfort with what is usually referred to as “religious coercion.” We very much enjoyed living in a Jewish State that was Jewish not only by virtue of the majority of its populace, but also because traditional Jewish holidays were national holidays and the public square used to be recognizably Jewish. It is not important in this context to point fingers of blame for this, but in our 30 years here the public square in Israel has grown ever more secular, ever more distanced from its Jewish roots, just as the religiously observant have largely retreated into self-made ghettos. From our perspective, attempts to force Judaism down the throats of Israelis have boomeranged. Whether that is indeed the cause or not is less important than the fact that the public face of Israel has changed beyond recognition in our years here.

Let us give one example of this phenomenon. When we moved here, our synagogue had a second minyan for kol nidre for our non-observant neighbors, and the entire neighborhood congregated around the synagogue, even if they did not come in. Nowadays, there is no second kol nidre minyan, no one hangs around the synagogue, and although most secular Israelis fast and do not drive on Yom Kippur (out of vestigial cultural identification), since the roads are almost entirely empty, they are taken over by kids on bikes and roller blades. That is the Yom Kippur these children will remember when they grow up: fancy bikes and empty roads as opposed to empty stomachs.

To simplify a very complicated process, over the years that we have lived here, Israel has become more and more like America (for good and for ill), and as it has grown ever more American, one might think that the ideological rationale for living here has grown weaker (after all, we came here to participate in the process of building a recognizably Jewish—culturally, not necessarily halakhically— nation, not an imitation North America). That our ideological Zionism has not become attenuated is, largely—it is odd to say—thanks to hatred of Israel in so-called progressive circles around the world. To our surprise, Li-heyot am hofshi beArtseinu—to be a free nation in our land—remains HaTikvah, the not-yet- realized hope, of the Zionist movement. Thirty years ago it seemed that the hope had been realized; over the last decade it has become clear that our hopeful dream is a nightmare for wide swaths of “enlightened” opinion around the world (and in “elite” circles in Israel). Suddenly, once again, to be a Zionist is to be a revolutionary, to go against the current.

Another surprise: Israel was meant to cure anti-Semitism; sadly, it has not. Only 60 years after the Holocaust, our generation is once again called upon to defend the right of Jews to live and to live as a free nation in its own homeland.

Living in Israel is once again more than simply making a living in Hebrew. We are challenged to show that the dream is worthwhile and attainable. For people like us, that makes living in Israel even more compelling than it was 30 years ago when we made aliya.

Preface

            “Jewish, not Israeli” is a phrase I found myself repeating to many a Palestinian this summer (the summer of May 2010, following my senior year of high school) at Seeds of Peace international conflict resolution camp. Although I was part of the American delegation, and by definition not an Israeli, I was often identified by Palestinian campers as the “other side.” But Israel is neither my birthplace nor my current home, so one need not have expected my beliefs to oppose Palestinian existence.

            Seeds of Peace is a nonprofit organization that brings together young adults from conflict areas in the Middle East and Southeast Asia to share their personal stories from the conflicts that often shape their lives. Two hours of every day at camp, a dialogue was facilitated among a group of about four Israelis, four Palestinians, two Egyptians, two Jordanians, and two or three Americans, when the campers had a unique opportunity to discuss the conflict on both a political and personal level. The rest of each day, the campers played sports and games or participated in lighthearted activities that allowed them to get to know one another outside their national identities.

            As a Jewish American, I often found it difficult to define my role in the dialogue sessions, as well as at other times among my peers. My connection to Israel had thus far been solely a religious one, and I had never explored the idea that perhaps I have an obligation to defend the land as a political state. I found that many of the Palestinians’ stories resonated with me on a personal human level. And while I did not necessarily always agree with their presentations, I had a deeper historical and national connection with the Israeli narrative. I felt that as a Jew I have some obligation to the State of Israel, although I could not define what that obligation is or whether the State of Israel has an obligation to me as Jew. 

            The tension I felt between the identities “Jewish” and “Israeli” led me to explore the perspective and self-identification of my Israeli friends who were at the camp. None of them practiced mitzvoth or Jewish customs; none had been educated at religious schools; their familiarity with Jewish texts, practice, and religious history was extremely minimal. Except for one or two Israelis in the program, the only defining characteristic of their Jewish was is the fact that they live in the Land of Israel. To most of them, being Jewish was not part of their national identity; rather, it is a religious heritage, and one hardly relevant to their lives. To these secular Israelis, to be a Jew means something different than to be part of the Israeli nation, the former being an abstract, religious identity and the latter being a tangible, definable political identity. When the dialogues would turn to the legitimacy of the State of Israel, Judaism was not factored into the equation by secular Israelis, because in their minds the two identities are separate. This tension between Zionism and Judaism can largely be explained by the fact that Zionism is an ideology that emphasizes a land with borders, and a government, while Judaism was originally defined first and foremost by an event that took place outside the land of Israel, and for the past 2,000 years has been about a relationship between a nation and God—whether that nation lives in the land of Israel or not.

            The Jewish nation is unique in its definition and establishment, and especially in its relationship to land. It began as a family, descended from Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—defined primarily by blood—united by the events that took place after the Exodus from Egypt and ultimately forming a sovereign state following the conquest of the land of Canaan. Although the Jews became an autonomous nation within physical borders, the status of an Israelite was defined by descent. Therefore, the Jewish nation is a family that belongs in a land but is not reliant on a land in order to exist. There is no other case in which a nation is defined as a nation before it enters a land; every other nation unites as a nation as a result of geographical commonness. Philosopher Michael Wyschogrod, in his bookThe Body of Faith, articulates this unique quality of the Jewish nation.

The land had to be conquered. The result has been that Jewish consciousness has vividly retained the memory of the land as having belonged to others before it came to belong to Israel. Other nations do not retain such memories. Their memory does not go back to a time when they did not occupy their land. In fact, the national identities of other nations are land-bound identities. The nation is defined by the territory it occupies. But [the Jewish nation] comes into national existence before it occupies the land. It becomes a nation on the basis of a promise delivered to it when it is a stranger in the land of others. This awareness of being a stranger is burned into Jewish consciousness. The God of Israel is not a God whose jurisdiction is defined by territorial boundaries. (Wyschogrod, 220—221)

Wyschogrod further explains that what unites Jews is their familial descent from Abraham. As such, Jews do not internalize the common Western division between faith and nationality. To be a Jew is not merely to have religious obligations, it is first and foremost to be part of a family and nation.

Judaism is not a set of beliefs, however broadly that term be interpreted. A full definition of Judaism does, of course, involve a whole complex of ideas, beliefs, values and obligations posed by Judaism. The whole of the immense literary output of Judaism consists of the elaboration of just these ideas. But however crucial these are, they are, in a sense, superstructure rather than foundation. The foundation of Judaism is the family identity of the Jewish people as the descendants of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Whatever else is added to this must be seen as growing out of and related to the basic identity of the Jewish people as the seed of Abraham elected by God through descent from Abraham. (Wyschogrod, 57)

Because the Jewish nation is not defined by a geographical area but by a familial bond, it has been able to survive in exile for the past 2,000 years. Rabbi Meir Soloveichik has noted that “after they were exiled from the land with the destruction of the Temple in 70 C.E., [Jewish] nationhood remained intact for millennia, enabling a Jew born in 19^th-century Morocco to consider himself a member of the same nation as a Jew born in 19^th -century Poland.” The memory of—and the longing to return to—the land has also played a vital role in sustaining the cohesiveness of the Jewish nation through prayer and a collective ultimate goal, but it has never been the defining characteristic. As Rabbi Jonathan Sacks puts it, “there is a difference between where we are and who we are. Judaism is not wrong to see identity as a matter of birth” (Sacks, A Letter in the Scroll, 46).

            In the book of Exodus, Moses is one of the first Jews to struggle with his identity and with what it means to be a Jew. When God comes to him at the burning bush and assigns him his task of leading the Jews out of Egypt, Moses’ first question is “Who am I?” Moses is questioning the fundamental identity of nationhood. Who is he—what is his identity—that makes him qualified for such a job? He did not live among the rest of the Jews, was not brought up as they were, nor was he even considered one of them for most of his life. The only connection he had to his people was a familial one, and at this turning point in his life he questions the legitimacy or sufficiency of that connection. God answers him by explaining that He is the God of Moses’ ancestors, and, as Rabbi Sacks puts it, “Moses’ crisis is resolved and never reappears in that form. He now knows that he is part of an unfinished story that began with the patriarchs and continues through him. He may wear the clothes and speak the language of an Egyptian, but he is a Jew because that is who his ancestors were, and their hopes now rest on him” (Sacks, A Letter in the Scroll, 46). The Jewish nation is defined by ancestry, not by culture or location, and Moses’ return to his nation shows how strong the familial tie can be in holding a nation together. The Jewish nation has stayed alive without the bonds of language or homeland for hundreds of years, and Moses was the very first to demonstrate how powerful the bond of family can be in re-uniting a people.

            That Judaism is defined by a familial rather than a racial or geographical bond is evident in the conversion process. When one becomes a Jew, he or she severs all previous familial ties—her siblings are no longer her siblings, and he has neither a mother nor father; for he or she has joined a new family. Rabbi Meir Soloveichik, in his essay on conversion, “How Not to Become a Jew,” explains that “just like a born Jew, a convert is not only a coreligionist, not only a fellow citizen, but also a new brother or sister. In reciting Jewish liturgy, the convert joins all other Jews in referring to the Almighty as ‘the God of my fathers’; he means it, and he is meant to mean it, in more than a metaphorical sense.” For this reason, Rabbi Aaron Lichtenstein explains, conversion to Judaism is not a private religious baptism; it takes place in a Jewish court, because it is a citizenship hearing. Thus, Rabbi Lichtenstein notes, the biblical Ruth only informs Naomi that “your God will be my God,” after she first declared, “your nation will be my nation.” Because the Jews are a family, a child born to a Jewish mother will be a Jew from the moment of birth (unlike a child born to a Christian mother who becomes Christian upon baptism) until his death, regardless of his actions or beliefs. The Jewish people is the only people that is considered both a religion and a nation, and is not defined conventionally like any other faith or nation. This uniqueness gives the Jews a special role in both of mankind’s religious and nationalistic spheres.

            This familial connection, which overrides differences in language, culture, appearance, location, and even denomination, has allowed the Jews to remain a nation even while dispersed over the globe. And interestingly, as Michael Wyschogrod writes, it is the Jews’ definition of themselves as a nation without a land that allowed the land-based State of Israel to come into existence in the first place.

Modern Israel could not have come into being without it. Out of people of the most diverse cultural and national traditions, Israel created one people. To be more accurate, it did not create such a people but found one in existence. In the early stages of the Zionist movement, European Jews had little acquaintance with non-European, Sephardic Jews…Yet the viability of a state made up of such diverse elements was never brought into question. There was a bond among Jews that was deeper than all the differences, which turned out to be far more superficial than would have been thought. (Wyschogrod, 240)

But the nation that arose, the modern State of Israel, relies on borders and government and judicial systems. For 2,000 years, the Jewish nation was not defined by geography, but with the rise of the State of Israel, the two identities became intertwined and often confused. Jewishness had for ages provided the bond of family, religion, and nationality to Jews everywhere, but Israeli nationality, if not defined properly, can create a new set of definitions for what it means to be Jewish and create divisions among Jews. The elements of Jewishness that allowed the Jews to remain a nation without a land also enabled the birth of the State of Israel to succeed. But this new state by its existence invites Israelis to redefine their nationhood as land-based, and the nation to which they belong as Israeli rather than Jewish. This new identity and definition carries the danger that Jewishness will no longer be about nationality, and will be redefined solely as a religious vocation.

            This is precisely the tension I witnessed at Seeds of Peace among my secular Israeli friends. Several months after camp had ended, I went to Israel to investigate this dialectic that exists between the Jewish and Israeli identities. I interviewed several of my secular Israeli friends, to hear in their own words how this tension played out in their self-identification and their identification with their state and of their faith. Among the questions I asked were: What is Israel? What does it mean to be part of the nation of Israel? What does it mean to be part of the Jewish nation? And what nations did your ancestors belong to?

            When asked to define the State of Israel, Nili, a self-defined secular Israeli from Petah Tikvah who attended Seeds of Peace, explained that it is “my home. The place I was born,” and went on to say that being part of the nation of Israel means “you belong to somewhere, you have a place that you live and you have a place that is it for you, because I’m a Jew, it’s my country so [I] belong to it.” For Nili, being Israeli is her nationality that she says is connected to the fact that she is Jewish; but when asked what it means to be part of the Jewish nation, she responded by saying (translated from Hebrew), “I am not so connected to my faith because I don’t really do mitzvoth and all of that.” In other words, for Nili, her Jewishness is a religious matter rather than a national one; she added, however, that she understands that other Jews, as they travel all over the world, “feel as if they have a community, that they have people to rely on.” She understands the connection that Jews have, but does not include herself in it, because, to Nili, Judaism is separate from her national self-identity. She defines herself as Israeli, and although she acknowledges that being Jewish contributes to that identity—along with the fact that she was physically born in the state—she does not recognize that the identities are intertwined, and that the State of Israel’s existence is a result of the fact that the Jewish nation was able to stay strong and proud and connected throughout the centuries.

To Nili, nationality is her primary identity, and she does not feel as if she is part of another community other than the State of Israel. She sees nationality as being bound by land. I then asked Nili,

            “Where are your ancestors from, and what nation did they belong to?”

             “My grandparents are from Russia, and they were Russians, on both sides.”

            “But what nation did they belong to?”

            “Russian.”

She did not say they are part of the Jewish nation or of an ultimately larger community not defined by borders; her grandparents would have certainly defined themselves as Jews first and foremost, and would have been shocked to be referred to as Russians. Before 1948, Jews had a hard time being faithful countrymen because often their countries betrayed them, and they also had to struggle to hold on to their Jewish identities. Identifying with the Jewish nation was important for survival. My experience is that “Israeli” easily replaces “Jewish” for people who live in Israel who do not practice Judaism or make it a prominent part of their existence. Nili acknowledges that Judaism plays a role in her overall sense of self, but it is not center stage, and is just a component of her nationality. When asked what the purpose of the State of Israel is, Nili said, “To bring all the Jews to one place because there has always been anti-Semitism, and I think that they should all live in one place so that they can have a government and an army and so that they can protect themselves.” For Nili, Israel is a Jewish State so that the Jewish people can live peacefully. To her, the Jews need to create for themselves a nationality with government and autonomy like every other nation so that they can define themselves as every other nation does, with borders and a government. The irony is that the existence of the State of Israel, a testament to Jewish resilience, also enables non-practicing Jews in Israel to forget the long-standing uniqueness of the Jewish definition of nationhood, which does not rely on geographical commonness, into a land-based nationalistic one.

            Many of the other self-defined secular Israeli friends I interviewed came to conclusions similar to Nili’s. Nadav, a secular Israeli living in Tel Aviv, who did not attend Seeds of Peace, said that being part of the Israeli nation means “living and being part of the Israeli life, living in Israel,” and that being part of the Jewish nation means “living among other Jews and participating in life with other Jews,” with no mention of history or ancestry. Nadav very clearly separates the two identities on a very technical level; neither identity is reliant on the other. Like Nili, Nadav said that the purpose of the State of Israel is to create a solution to anti-Semitism and to bring all the Jews to one place so that they can “express themselves as a nation.” He acknowledges the role that the Jewish nation plays in the establishment of Israel, but still his national identity takes precedence over his Jewish identity. He describes his ancestors as belonging to the nations of Poland, Russia, and Hungary, in the same way that he belongs to the nation of Israel. “The same way the French are connected with France because it’s the land of their ancestors, a territory that they have an emotional connection with, that’s Israel for me.” Nadav views nationality as being strictly land-based and, although he sees a connection between his ancestors and his nationality, he is referring to his ancestors who actually inhabited the same land that he does now, not the ones who may not have necessarily lived in Israel; they do not provide for him a reason to be Israeli.

            Nadav goes on on to create a divide between his religion and nationality, explaining that government and statehood should only be influenced by religion “as long as it does not interfere with democracy. The existence of Israel as a modern nation-state separate from the Jewish identity ultimately leaves my friends with a contradiction: why should they be allowed to form a new nation in this specific land? If Jews are not defined by descent from Abraham, with whom God formed a covenant and to whom He promised the Holy Land, then by what right do modern Israelis in this century lay claim to this land with these borders?

            The contradiction that the secular Israelis pose for themselves became evident to me during my visit when I interviewed my fellow Palestinian campers from Seeds. As I noted, secular Israelis create a divide between their identity as Jews and their identity as Israelis when asked about how they define themselves and what it means to be part of each nation—but to some extent the Israeli identity requires Judaism for its legitimacy, and here these Israelis either contradict themselves or remain answerless. In contrast, my Palestinian friends ironically understand that Zionism is intimately bound up with the fact that all Jews share a national status, and that their claim to the land lies in Jewish history and in the religious longings of Judaism. I asked Fadi, a Palestinian living in the West Bank who attended Seeds of Peace, how he thinks the Israeli nation defines and legitimizes itself. When asked to define the Jewish nation, Fadi hesitantly answered “Israel,” because to him the identities “Jewish” and “Israeli” go hand in hand, and, although he knows that fundamentally they are different, he also knows that the Israeli identity relies on components of Judaism. When asked what Israelis say to defend their right to be in Israel and to what extent he thinks their claim is legitimate, Fadi answered that “their excuse is that the country was promised to them by God, I can’t deny or agree or say [it’s legitimate]… I don’t mind living with Jews, but not in this kind of way.” Fadi sees the connection that Judaism has to the State of Israel and refers to the people that he lives among as Jews, not Israelis. Similarly, Jalal, a Palestinian from East Jerusalem who also attended Seeds of Peace, defined the Jewish nation as “Israel” and said (partly translated from Arabic), “I think Israelis say, almost all of them, that it is the land that they are promised to be in by the Bible, that it’s written that it’s the promised land and that they have to be in it and protect it…”

            The Palestinians acknowledge the interconnected relationship between the Jewish nation and the Israeli nation, more so than my secular Israeli friends, because they know that it explains why Jews all over the world are allowed instant Israeli citizenship and why Israel was ultimately formed in the Middle East, and not in Uganda. Judaism has answers to all the arguments that question the State’s existence, even though they are not the only answers. The State was established for many reasons, such as to create a haven from anti-Semitism, as Nili and Nadav said, but the other reasons do not answer the questions that only a historical and religious claim to the land of Israel can.

            The Palestinian definition of nationhood is similar to that of secular Israelis—a definition that allows there to be a situation in which the nation could no longer exist. When I asked Fadi what it means to be part of the Palestinian nation, he corrected me and said that Palestine is not a nation:

            “If Palestine was a nation, it would be nice.”

            “Why isn’t Palestine a nation?”

            “Because it’s under occupation.”

            “What does that mean that it’s under occupation?”

“That a country under occupation is a country that is ruled by a different power other than its own people, including water resources, land, freedom of transportation.”

            “So it’s not a nation if it doesn’t have a country?”

            “It’s people…but it’s not a nation because it’s not a country.”

This definition of nationhood is completely based on land and statehood, a definition that the Jewish nation has never applied to itself until now. According to this definition, one that secular Israelis adhere to, nationhood is bound up with statehood, which 2,000 years in exile has proven not to be the case for the Jewish nation.

            What emerged in my interviews of secular Israelis is that at times, inability to account for the link between Jewish nationhood and Zionism causes the most secular Israelis to completely redefine the State of Israel and its purpose. Shahar, a secular Israeli from Jerusalem who did not attend Seeds of Peace, is a young woman who believes that being part of the Israeli nation means to “be ready to sacrifice yourself for others, to be ready to give up some of what you have so that others will be in a better situation.” Shahar completely separates her religious identity from her nationalistic identity. She said in her interview that she needs Israel for the same reason that the French need France and that the English need England—for reasons solely dependent on geographical circumstances. After Shahar explained that government should not be influenced by religion, I asked her how there could possibly be a Jewish state, and she answered that Israel is not a Jewish state but an Israeli state and that the Jewish religion is an entirely separate entity: “It began as a Jewish state but in my opinion [it changed], I don’t see it as a Jewish state anymore, it can’t stay like that… especially when the population changes so much.” Shahar completely redefines the State of Israel in a way that would not please most Jews around the world and even many of her fellow Israelis. When asked what is significant about the State’s location, Shahar explained that it is the perfect place to build a country—due to the “diversity of terrain, the location of Israel is so special. We have deserts and mountains and everything…the greenery in the North and the emptiness in the South it shows all the amazing things that can happen here.” This redefinition does not provide answers to the most difficult questions that face the young country today. According to Shahar, her immigrant grandparents should not be allowed citizenship anymore than a non-Jew from Asia. She could not answer the question of “why not Uganda?”

            Before the end of my trip, I had a chance to interview my self-defined religious Israeli friend Daniella from Jerusalem, who did not attend Seeds of Peace, and ask her the same questions that I had asked the secular Israelis. She immediately defined herself as “a religious, Jewish, Israeli” and as belonging to the “Jewish and Israeli nations, but more importantly the Jewish nation.” She explained that being part of the Israeli nation means (translated from Hebrew) “to care about the existence of the nation…To me to be Israeli feels like everything is on your shoulders, not every day, but we are always fighting to exist.” When asked what it means to be part of the Jewish nation, Daniella immediately responded that it is “the same thing. Jewish and Israeli isn’t the same thing but they have the same idea that we are united and in danger all the time and we always have to protect ourselves in order to preserve our nation.” To Daniella, Judaism requires as much protection as the State of Israel because they are both nations viewed in the eyes of the world as being intertwined. She views the two identities as needing protection from the same threats, acknowledging the close bond between the two and the fact that many components of the Israeli nation rely on the Jewish nation. She went on to explain that “I think all Jews should live in the State of Israel because all Jews should live together… in the Land of Israel because I believe in the Tanakh and this is the state for the Jews…. I know that we also need the state for [protection from anti-Semitism], but I don’t think that this is the main reason.” Daniella’s opinion regarding the Jewish presence in Israel poses no contradiction when asked what is significant about the State’s location: “I know it has to be here and not in Uganda, to me it is because the Tanakh says so.” Daniella also remains consistent in her opinion that all Jews have the right to live in Israel as she explains that her grandparents, although they are from Hungary, South Africa, Syria, and Romania, “they all share the Jewish nationality,” and so they all have an equal right to Israeli citizenship in the Land of Israel. She does not see the Jewish nation as a land-based one, but as a nation that wants to be based in a certain land.

            In May of 2009, Binyamin Netanyahu, the current Prime Minister of Israel, addressed the country and acknowledged the problem that many Israelis have with associating their heritage with their current way of life. He explained that the maintenance of historical ties can have a profound effect on the modern nation-state.

In the Book of Books—in the Bible—a subject that is close to my heart these days. It starts there. It moves through the history of our people: the Second Temple, the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, leaving the ghettos, the rise of Zionism, the modern era, the wars fought for Israel’s existence—the history of Zionism and of Israel. A people must know its past in order to ensure its future… our existence depends not only on a weapons system, our military strength, the strength of our economy, our innovation, our exports, or on all these forces that are indeed essential. It depends, first and foremost, on the knowledge and national sentiment we as parents bestow on our children, and as a state to its education system. It depends on our culture; it depends on our cultural heroes; it depends on our ability to explain the justness of our path and demonstrate our affinity for our land—first to ourselves and then to others.

Netanyahu acknowledges the fact that in order for Israel to sustain its identity as a nation as well as its legitimacy it must take initiative to strengthen the ties between the heritage of the Israeli nation—the Jewish nation—and the new generation of Israelis.

            When reflecting on this experience, I was struck by differences between the opinions of the secular and religious Israelis. Although the visions and goals of both groups may be very similar, their approaches to fulfilling them are drastically different and can have many different consequences. For example, the secular Israelis who view Judaism solely as a religion and Israel solely as a land-based nation—two identities that are not fundamentally intertwined— may never be able to defend their presence in the Middle East, while religious Israelis who believe that the purpose of the State of Israel is primarily to provide the opportunity for Jews to live in the Land of Israel may wind up being insensitive to the claims and rights of non-Jewish Israelis who live in the land. Both identities are important and represent realities that the State of Israel must deal with and reconcile. Both categories of people feel strongly about their presence and the justifications for it, and although they present an array of arguments as well as contradictions, to quote Daniella, “we are all Jews and ultimately want the same things.” Although both approaches to Zionism have positive and negative aspects, the fact that the two cannot reconcile their lack of unity regarding self-identity poses a threat. A society that cannot explain itself cannot ensure its survival. The secular Israelis’ contradictory answers to my questions make me nervous that ultimately they will not be able to answer the larger questions that the world will ask: Why there? Why you? Who are you?

            By the end of the experience, I realized that the conflict that Seeds of Peace sets out to settle is just one of many problems that the State of Israel faces. The fact that there is such a large divide in both opinion and practice between secular and religious Israelis poses a problem regarding identity, self-defense, and self-sustenance. As someone who is good friends with both, I have come to the conclusion that both secular and religious Israeli Jews can learn from one another how to value the different approaches to nationality and create a more cohesive society, one better able to protect the land in the present and plant the real seeds of

As the head of the Center for Women's Justice, I encounter on a daily basis the intractable entanglement—the “Gordian knot”—of State and (Orthodox) religion in Israel. This union of religion and state supports a gendered society, infringes on the basic rights of women, challenges the democratic values of the State, and threatens to undermine Israel's integrity as the political expression of the Jewish nation.

Using some of the cases that have come my way at CWJ, I will illustrate the above and argue that the place of “Orthodoxy” in Israel should not be within the coercive sphere of the “state,” but within the voluntary sphere of “civil society,” alongside other expressions of Jewishness.

An Intrinsically Gendered Society

In Israel, the Chief Rabbinate Law of 1980 states that the Chief Rabbinate is authorized to give answers and opinions regarding Jewish law, to bring the public closer to the values of the Torah and its commandments, to issue kashrut certificates, and to decide who shall sit as rabbinic judges and as official city and community rabbis. The Rabbinic Courts Jurisdiction Law of 1953 (Marriage and Divorce) gives rabbinic courts sole jurisdiction over matters of marriage and divorce.[i] The Chief Rabbinate and the Rabbinic Courts are exclusively Orthodox, and they are gendered. Men and woman are not equal.

No woman serves on the Chief Rabbinate Council, or as an official rabbi of any city in Israel. No woman is permitted to sit on rabbinic courts as a judge.[ii] The Chief Rabbinate and its Rabbinic Courts are run by men. The Rabbinic Court Administration Office has tried to bar women from applying for positions as law clerks.[iii] In the Petah Tikvah Rabbinic Court, until recently, no woman sat in any position, even an administrative one.

Rabbinic Courts apply religious laws that discriminate between men and women. Women appearing before rabbinic courts have little say in their attempts to divorce their husbands. Grounds for divorce for women are few, if any, and are not mutual. [iv] If a woman refuses to accept a Jewish divorce (a get), the state has an specific exception to its bigamy laws[v] to allow him to marry another woman and continue with his life (heter-meah rebbanim). If a man refuses to give his wife a get, she can be bound to him forever.[vi]

This taken-for-granted gendered, and discriminatory, world of the Orthodox rabbinic courts trickles down into other parts of Israeli society in the name of pluralism, and tolerance. So, for example, Egged, the state bus company, had (until recently) allowed, facilitated, and enforced “separate” buses in which women were expected to sit at the back of the bus, separate, apart, and unequal to men.[vii] The Supreme Court of the State of Israel has barred women from praying at the Western Wall in prayer shawls and phylacteries and has, instead, delegated the women to a separate, but not quite equal, section of the wall.[viii]

The Infringement on the Bodies—and Basic Rights—of Women

In Israel, the state authorizes the Chief (Orthodox) Rabbinate and its (Orthodox) Rabbinic Courts to “discipline and punish”[ix] the bodies of women.

The Chief Rabbinate Office is responsible for monitoring, registering, and conducting all marriages between Jews in Israel. It requires all Jewish women, as a precondition to their marriage, to immerse in a ritual bath (mikveh); to undergo a course on when and how to conduct their sexual lives with their husbands; and to set a date of their wedding in accordance with their menstrual cycle.[x] The Chief Rabbinate issues directives that determine the way to operate the (state built) ritual baths that service (the bodies of) Jewish women, and has recommended that attendants refuse access to women who are single or divorced.[xi]

The Rabbinic Courts set and interpret all laws regarding divorce between Jews in Israel. According to those courts, adultery on the part of a woman is absolute grounds for divorce; whereas adultery on the part of a husband can be forgiven.[xii] The court sometimes conduct “sex” trials to try to bar a woman from engaging in sexual relations after marriage with a man who may have been her lover; and, should the trial prove the allegations true, the rabbinic court can direct the Ministry of Interior to note the fact on the woman's divorce ruling, thus literally branding her with a letter “A” and “outing” her lover on official state documents.[xiii] Should a Jewish woman commit adultery and bear a child of that illicit relationship, the court can conduct a hearing that will put such child on a blacklist that prevents the child from marrying another Jew (mamzer).[xiv] Moreover, under Jewish law as applied by Israeli Rabbinic Courts, a man can withhold a divorce from his wife indefinitely, infringing on her autonomy and freedom.[xv]

Challenges to the Values of a Liberal, Democratic State

By deferring to the (Orthodox) Chief Rabbinate and its Rabbinic Courts in all matters relating to marriage and divorce, the state infringe directly on the freedom of conscience of Israelis by subjecting them to religious irrespective of their religious beliefs, or lack thereof.

Israelis are not free to marry in the religious ceremony of their choice. Only Orthodox ceremonies are recognized by the state. Conservative and Reform ceremonies are not allowed, though many non-Orthodox rabbis conduct such ceremonies for their constituents despite the fact that those marriages will not be registered by the Ministry of Interior. (Members of Parliament have proposed to make such ceremonies specifically illegal.)[xvi] No civil marriage or intermarriage is conducted in Israel.

Israelis are also not free to divorce in a manner of their choice. Even if they married abroad in a wedding recognized by the state under the rules of reciprocity (thus managing to bypass religious coercion at the wedding stage), if both husband and wife are Jewish, the couple will find themselves back on the steps of the rabbinate at the time of divorce. Recently, a rabbinic court held that such a couple must undergo the religious get ceremony in order to be divorced, and even incarcerated the husband until he gave the get.[xvii] Such order was a gross infringement on the husband's freedom of conscience, not to mention his physical freedom, and ironically, in direct contradiction of halakhic decisors, both in Israel and the Diaspora, who have held that Jewish couples who marry in a civil ceremony do not need a get. The husband had agreed to the divorce and simply wanted a decision of the court declaring that he was no longer married.

Israelis are not free to follow their conscience when going to the mikveh. Recently a young high school woman studying at a well-respected Jerusalem High School asked CWJ to petition the High Court of Justice to order the attendants at the mikveh to allow her to use the facilities when the attendant refused her access because she was single.

A Threat to the Viability of the Jewish Nation-State

One can argue that the Israeli state has effectively, and perhaps inadvertently, rendered “Orthodoxy” as the established “church” of the state of Israel[xviii] or as its official state religion.[xix] This gives voice, authority, and validation to “Orthodoxy” as a reflection of the “Jewishness” of the Israeli nation state, while in reality the (Orthodox) Rabbinate and Rabbinic Courts are not at all concerned with the values and interests of the state,  but rather with what they feel are the values and interests of the pan-national, or tran-national, Jewish people/religion. And the two are not necessarily in sync.

Thus, for the sake of the integrity of both the Jewish people and the Jewish nation, I posit that it is necessary to separate the Jewish “nation” from the Jewish “people,” and leave the imagining of the Jewish nation to its own separate sphere and consideration. This separation is not an easy feat, conceptually or practically, and it is one that has challenged the mighty and great. In 1970, Judge Moshe Zilberg, pondering the question whether one could be a Jew by nationality but not by religion,[xx] could not find a way to separate the two conceptions. He wrote: Nation (leum) and People (am) are synonyms and have the same meaning.”[xxi]

Judge Haim Cohen, on the other hand, understood that one's Jewishness from a religious perspective is not necessarily the same as ones Jewishness from a national perspective and that, when imagining what is a Jewish nation, the courts or whoever else is doing such imagining, must be guided by considerations such as human rights and freedoms. He wrote:

The halakha has its place of honor… I can imagine other purely legal considerations, with basic constitutional consideration at the fore, among them basic freedoms and human rights, that must guide a court's steps when it will, in the future, have to decide the question of a persons “nationality.” All of these considerations are legitimate and must move the court, and even obligate it, to decide the issue in a way that is not consonant with laws of religion.[xxii]

A Jewish nation, Cohen seems to be saying, must, first and foremost, be one that is consonant with and sensitive to human rights and freedoms.

The Need for a Place in “Civil Society”

While I have made a strong argument to take the Jewish (Orthodox) “religion” out of the Jewish state and its coercive state apparatuses, I would also like to make a strong argument for nurturing and sustaining Jewishness in the “nation” sense as a reflection of the morals and values of the Jewish state. To do this I would not relegate the Jewish religion to the very private sphere of the individual and family. Instead, I would place Jewishness in all its manifestation, as culture/tradition/religion, in the very public sphere of civil society—the space inhabited by voluntary civic, social, and religious organizations and institutions.

I would like Jewish culture/ tradition/religion to flourish in the State of Israel, thus sustaining the Jewish nation. I would even suggest that the state support the various activities of the various civic and social expressions of Jewish culture/tradition/religion without preferring one expression of Jewishness over the other. Israel should become the Mecca for Jewish learning, writing, art, music, and religious denominations of all sorts, including of course Orthodoxy in all its permutations. In the public sphere, and subject to human rights and religious freedom, Judaism would be the cultural capital of all Jews, Israeli and otherwise.[xxiii]

No religion—whether the current Orthodox, or any other variation thereof, be it benevolent Orthodox, Open Orthodox, Reform, or Conservative—should be thrust on the citizen of a democratic state. Today's benevolent Orthodox is tomorrows fundamentalist. The democratic and liberal values of a modern state must allow for freedom of conscience, or reflections of Judaism that may not be the ones that we personally espouse. Only such pluralism and tolerance with keep us together. Forcing all of us into one narrow, square hole for the sake of supposed unity and uniformity, is not working. Instead, it is alienating the great majority of us Jews from both the state and the religion.

Haval, what a shame. We Israelis and Jews of all denominations, including the ultra-Orthodox, deserve a more hopeful, pluralistic, and tolerant reality.

On Changes in Jewish Liturgy

Options and Limitations

By Daniel Sperber

Urim Publications, 2010, 221 pages          

This is the second recent volume where Daniel Sperber, professor, rabbi, author of thirty books and more than four hundred articles, a leading expert on Jewish laws and customs, addresses what many consider deplorable treatments of women in Judaism.

The earlier book, Women and Men in Communal Prayer, treated the exclusion of women from being called to the reading of the Torah, called aliyot, in Orthodox Jewish synagogues. It offered the opinions of four prominent, well-respected, and articulate men, rabbis and scholars. Two, including Sperber advocated changing the current practice to allow women to participate more than presently. Two opposed the change. All four approached the issue from “halakhic perspectives,” meaning that the authors articulated opinions based on the precedents of past rabbinic rulings.

Sperber, as is his custom, presented a host of examples to support his view that the concept of “human dignity” should trump all arguments that disallow full participation of women in the Torah reading service. He did not contradict Jewish halakhah (law), but argued that the concept of “human dignity” is a vital part of halakhah. He uses the same historical halakhic approach in this volume. He shows that the law is not what people think.

This volume asks: can changes be made in Jewish prayers? Sperber examines many prayers, including the three blessings that are part of the introduction to the morning service, prayers that set the daily mood.

The origin of these “blessings offensive to women” is a statement by a second century CE rabbi in the Babylonian Talmud, Menakhot 43b:

It was taught: R. Meir says: A person (read, man) must say three benedictions every day, and these are they: “who has made me an Israelite (meaning, a Jew); who has not made me a woman; who has not made me an ignoramus.” Rav Aha bar Yaakov heard his son reciting the blessing, “Who has not made me an ignoramus.” He said to him: Why do you recite this blessing? Surely the ignoramus is also obligated in mitzvot.

Rav Aha advises his son to substitute “Who has not made me a slave.”

Should these prayers be recited as they are written because they are a Jewish tradition? Are they sacred because they were unchanged for two millennia and were repeated in this format by generations of Jews? Are Jewish prayers never changed? Sperber shows with dozens of persuasive examples, and with footnotes as long as the text itself, for those readers desiring further proof, in a dispassionate, scholarly, and easy-to-read manner that the answer to all of these questions is “no.”

He cites early talmudic sources showing that rabbis were sensitive to the feelings of women and disliked Rabbi Meir’s blessings. Remarkably, he discloses that the source of the blessings is not Jewish at all. Parallel Greek benedictions “are found in Greek classical sources, specifically in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and in other Greek sources from the fifth century BCE,” some seven hundred years before Rabbi Meir.

                        Blessed are You Who made me an Athenian and not a barbarian.

                        Blessed are You Who has made me a man and not a woman.

                        Blessed are You Who has made me a free man and not a slave.

Sperber quotes many alternative versions of the Jewish wording written by rabbis who saw that “the Jewish prayers were deemed offensive to women.” He quotes also a host of examples of the changes made in other prayers. For example, he sites “nineteen (!) different versions of R. Meir’s first blessing, ‘Who made me an Israelite.’” He notes that our current prayer book changed Rabbi Meir’s blessing from a positive to a negative statement, “who has not made me a heathen” and that the prayer book has a new alternative version to “who has not made me a woman” that women can say, “who has made me according to his will.” So changes do occur.

In fact he sites many examples of changes, such as many different versions of the very important daily amidah prayers. He notes that different groups of Jews, Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Oriental, Chasidim, Mystics, and others have different wordings of prayers and even made substitutions. He cites the first Lubavitch Rebbe rewriting many of the prayers. He mentions the new prayers such as the prayer for Israel, America, Israeli soldiers, Israel’s Independence Day, and others. He tells about the insertions by poets of piyutim and tehinot, poems and supplications, into the prayer book and the changes made by printers. He reminds us that half of the Friday evening service, called Kabbalat Shabbat, is a sixteenth century invention of the mystics to Safed in Israel. He tells tales of mystics changing prayers so that the number of letters and words would suggest their notions of mystical lessons. He recalls that many prayers are different today because of Christian censors. These are just some of the multitude of alterations that he relates.

Thus, Sperber makes it crystal clear that past changes made in the prayer book show that changes are allowed. As an Orthodox rabbi, he concludes that a person should not “alter the text of the prayers in accordance with his current state of mind. Of course, this is not feasible, nor is it our intended message. We are speaking only of changes mandated by communal needs, major historical events or broad sociological changes.”

Is it enough, is it sufficiently sensitive and humane to allow women to say “who has made me according to his will” while encouraging men to thank God for not making them a woman?

No issue in Israeli public life arouses the range and intensity of emotions as does anything relating to Hareidim and Hareidism—the terms used for the “ultra-Orthodox” and their lifestyle. [1]  A typical discussion on any Hareidi-related issue is laden with ideology, dogma, and opinion, but short on facts, let alone hard data.

The sad reality is that most Israelis, including most dati-leumi (National Religious/ Modern Orthodox) Israelis, relate to Hareidim with a mixture of fear and loathing—and even hatred generated by that potent mixture. Hareidim feel much the same way about secular Israelis and, very often, about religious ones too. The mutual antipathy stems from the concern on each side that the other will seek to impose its views and lifestyle.

Yet this stereotyping tends to break down at the individual level. Thus, although the average Israeli will express strong negative views about Hareidim in general, s/he will often feel warmly toward Hareidi individuals he knows through family, community, or work connections. This is a positive and hopeful feature in a generally bleak picture, which carries important implications for the future—assuming Hareidim become more involved in, and even integrated into, the wider society.

That assumption is a critical issue—not just for the future of Hareidi society, but for the very existence of the State of Israel. I will argue here that the future is one of greater integration, but that outcome is far from assured. If the Hareidi sector of society adheres to the ideology of separation—which has been one of its bastions and sources of strength and which has, at least in some respects, intensified in recent years—then the tensions between the wider society and the Hareidim will be exacerbated, and the suppressed conflicts will likely become steadily more overt and possibly violent.

That negative scenario is much less likely, but it is essential to understand why. The reason is that the primary source of friction between the Hareidi and non-Hareidi sectors is no longer cultural, let alone ideological. In a postmodern society such as Israel, the acceptance of numerous lifestyles is increasingly the norm (even by Hareidim, as their self-defeating struggle against gay parades in Jerusalem illustrated very clearly). Most non-Hareidim therefore have no problem with Hareidism for Hareidim, although they obviously don’t like it or want it in their backyard. However, this acceptance is subject to two important conditions: that the Hareidim do not attempt to impose their values and life-styles on non-Hareidim, and that the Hareidi community and its lifestyle is not paid for by non-Hareidim. 

It is the first of the issues—perceived attempts by Hareidim to impose their mores and values on others—that generates most of the heat and light popularly associated with “Hareidi/ secular” clashes. Travel on Shabbat, gender separation on buses—these are the classic issues that have led to bitter and sometimes violent confrontations. But these are trivial matters in the wider scheme of things. At the macro level, the clash between the Hareidi sector of Israeli society and the non-Hareidi majority has been over resource allocation, which, in plain language, means money—but also manpower (because labor is also a resource, and a critical one at that).

As soon as the Hareidi/ non-Hareidi “clash” is put in those terms, it becomes more amenable to resolution. After all, in every country different groups and sectors of the population vie for “shares of the pie.” The competition may be between rich and poor, old and young, country versus city—each country has its own characteristics, but none is devoid of rivalry. In a democratic society it is the electoral process, which enables citizens to choose between the platforms of political parties, that provides a mechanism whereby that society decides how to divide up its proverbial pie. Each group’s starting point is that it deserves more, for whatever reason—but every group must relate its demand, either implicitly or explicitly, to its contribution to the overall society.

The Hareidi “Problem”—Burden or Blessing?

The singular feature of the Hareidi sector is that it bases its request for a growing share of the national pie on a contribution that the non-Hareidi majority does not recognize. The Hareidim claim, as an article of faith, that their contribution of studying Torah full-time is equal to, if not greater than, that of the majority who serve in the army and work for a living. For reasons that will be explored below, the non-Hareidi majority have acquiesced to an arrangement whereby Hareidi young men are not conscripted into the Israeli Defense Forces, nor do they join the labor force and engage in economic activity. Instead, they remain in a framework of institutions devoted to Torah study, encompassing secondary and tertiary education and developing into open-ended “post-graduate” studies in kollels for married men.

However, this acquiescence on the part of the political leadership of non-Hareidi Israelis does not reflect acceptance by them—let alone by the general public—of the principle that adult Torah study is an equivalent contribution to work and/or army service. Consequently, the growth of Israeli Hareidism has generated a widespread feeling that “the burden”—the financial burden of paying taxes, the economic burden of making the country self-supporting, and, above all, the physical/existential burden of defending the country—is not shared, and that the Hareidim do not pull their weight but rather live a parasitic existence, paid for and defended by their non-Hareidi compatriots. 

But since the highly democratic Israeli electoral system allows the Hareidim to express their beliefs and pursue their demands via political parties in the Knesset, and since the political system results in coalitions in which these parties are usually members—and since the Hareidi political parties’ primary raison d’être is to channel budgetary allocations to its constituency—the result has been that the Israeli public has continued to pay for the maintenance and expansion of Hareidi society.

To suggest that this is going to change is considered by most Israelis today as naive, ridiculous, or proof that the suggestor is detached from Israeli reality—or all of the above. Indeed, it is now universally accepted by informed and educated Israelis that the Hareidi population poses a major problem, even a threat, to the socio-economic well-being of the State of Israel—and hence to its existence. No serious analysis of the country, its society, economy and political structure, can or does fail to make this point. Even foreign analysts have “discovered” the Hareidi problem, which now features in analyses produced by the OECD and the IMF, as well as reports in the Economist magazine, The New York Times, and other important international news media.

The existence of so broad a consensus is a strong indication that the view it presents is very likely to be wrong. To the contrarian analyst, the only time you can be sure of anything is when there is unanimity among the experts about that subject. In particular, if the accepted wisdom is that something is a serious problem that seems intractable, then you can be fairly confident that it’s going to be all right. This general rule applies to the problem posed by Israeli Hareidism.

If I therefore move straight to the bottom line, my conclusion will be that the Hareidim are going to be integrated into the Israeli economy and, to a lesser extent, into Israeli society. This long and difficult process is already underway and is picking up speed. It is being driven by forces both from within Hareidi society and outside it, so that although the initial impetus for change may have been imposed on the Hareidim, today that is not the case. If anything the opposite is occurring: Change is being driven from within, by a new generation with a new mindset.

Last but not least, this conclusion does not mean that Hareidism is going to disappear, or that the Hareidim are going to become irreligious, or “Modern Orthodox,” or anything else. Hareidism of one sort or another is a permanent fixture within the spectrum of views and behavior that comprises Judaism, at least in the modern era. It can and will adjust, as it has done several times—despite the Hareidi mythology that they and their lifestyle are unchanging—and it is in the process of doing so again. This is tremendously good news for the Jewish people as a whole, for the State of Israel, and for the Israeli Hareidi community.

Mythology Meets Reality

Before analyzing the process of change underway, it is essential to review how we arrived at the current state of affairs. Along the way, we will discover how and why the process of change started some years ago.

The Hareidi problem, stripped of its emotional and religious over- and under-tones, boils down to one of demographics and economics and the relationship between these two areas. From an economic point of view, any society can afford—if it so chooses—to provide special privileges to a small group within it. In many societies, ancient and medieval, this group was the priesthood or clergy. The Torah itself adopts this concept by designating the tribe of Levi as the privileged group to be supported by the wider society in return for devoting itself to religious duties, both in the Temple and throughout the nation. Mainstream Hareidi ideology uses the Levites as an example and role-model for the position Hareidim wish to assume within Israeli society.

The concept of a small group of devoted scholars, engaged in keeping the flame of traditional Jewish study alive after the annihilation of the European Torah centers during the Holocaust, was accepted by Ben-Gurion and other secular leaders in the 1950s and provided the justification for the two key privileges granted the then-tiny Hareidi sector, namely the exemption of dedicated yeshiva students (and all religious girls) from army service and, even more importantly, the creation of a separate education stream for the Hareidi sector. At the time, these seemed to be minor concessions and did not attract significant attention; the cost, in social, military, and economic terms, was negligible.

However, two dynamics combined to change the relative position of the Hareidi sector within the wider society, and, consequently, to change the attitude of the silent majority of the population with regard to Hareidi privileges from one of passive acquiescence to increasingly vocal opposition. The first of these was demographic: Over time, the birth rate in the Hareidi sector rose dramatically, as this society adopted early marriage and large families not merely as social mores but rather as key cultural values. At the same time, the birth rate in the general population, especially the Jewish population, was declining as the immigrants from Europe and the Arab world adopted Western mores. The inevitable result was a steady rise in the relative size of the Hareidi sector within the overall Israeli population, from a negligible level at the foundation of the state to a small but noticeable minority by the 1970s.

This period—roughly the first three decades of Israel’s existence—is viewed today by many older Hareidim as a “golden age.” From their weak and marginal position in society, firmly planted in political opposition to the ruling Labor-left coalitions, the Hareidim were forced to struggle for anything they needed. Their small numbers and shared goals and needs forced them to work via a single political party—Agudat Yisrael—to protect and expand the privileges they had obtained. Their religious leadership, comprising a handful of outstanding personalities who had survived the Holocaust and were now dedicated to regenerating Hareidi life, focused their efforts on education as the means to produce a new generation committed to living by the old values and verities. Money was scarce, for the country as a whole and especially for the marginalized Hareidim but—as in the wider Israeli story—much was achieved, thanks to determination, focused efforts, and inspiring leadership.

In 1977, the second dynamic came into play. The “political upheaval” of May 1977 ended the hegemony of the Labor-left and brought to power a Likud-led center-right coalition. The new Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, invited Agudat Yisrael (AY) to join his government—and the invitation was accepted with alacrity. AY maintained that it could not accept ministerial positions because that would require accepting responsibility for government decisions and activities it could not approve of; instead, its representatives took deputy ministerial posts and other positions, notably the chairmanship of the Knesset Finance Committee, through which they became instrumental in making key policy decisions. More importantly, from the narrow sectoral perspective through which AY viewed its involvement in national politics, its entry into government and its prominent position in budgetary affairs allowed it to massively increase its access to funding for its institutions, educational and other.

The common perception is that from this point on, Hareidi power and influence rose steadily. This process was catalyzed by the deadlock between the two main political blocks that characterized Israeli politics through much of the 1980s and 1990s, and that allowed Hareidi parties to hold the balance of power and thereby to extract more concessions in return for their support. These concessions were almost always in the form of larger budgetary allocations, which gradually spread across a range of channels: the Ministry of Education provided budgets for the Hareidi school systems; the Ministry of Religion was the primary source of funding for yeshivot and kollels; the National Insurance Institute (NII), via its child allowances and other social welfare payments, became a critical source of funding for burgeoning Hareidi families; and, over time, a huge array of NGOs serving the Hareidi sector emerged, most of them reliant on government funding as their primary source of support.

To be fair, the process of tapping into the government budget to finance institutions and NGOs with a sectoral orientation was by no means a Hareidi monopoly. In the period from the late 1980s to the turn of the century, everyone got into the act, but the Hareidi parties were the acknowledged masters of this game—the biggest and the best.

Note that by this point it was necessary to speak of Hareidi parties in the plural. The old alliance of all the Hareidi groups under the AY umbrella broke down, once again under the twin forces of demographics and politics. There were now large numbers of people in each of the main sub-groups of the Hareidi sector—the Hassidim, the Mitnagdim (“Lithuanians”) and the Sephardim. The latter group not only broke away to form its own party but, under the leadership of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and his chief lieutenant, Aryeh Der’i, launched an unprecedented  campaign that reversed the secularization process underway among Sephardic Jewry. Shas grew to become a mass movement, led by Sephardi Hareidim but attractive to a much wider public. Its relationship with the other mainstream Hareidi party, Degel Hatorah, is complex and multi-faceted, but the basic fact remains that Shas views itself as a Zionist party and as a full partner in the governing of the state. [2]

The process described above, of financing the growth of Hareidi education, welfare, and other systems from the state budget, was both the cause and the effect of Hareidi demographic and political expansion in the 1990s. It reached its climax in the “Halpert Law” of 1999, named after an AY Knesset member and foisted on another weak coalition in desperate need of Hareidi support in order to cling to power. The law changed the structure of child allowance payments from the NII so that, whereas hitherto the additional allowance for children under the age of 18 rose until the fifth child and then declined, now it would continue rising: each marginal child would bring in a relatively larger stipend. The obvious beneficiaries if this law would be the Hareidim—but also the Bedouin Arabs, where polygamous family structures existed and NII stipends enabled and encouraged high birth-rates.

The Halpert Law proved to be the high-point of Hareidi political power. But it is important to note that even in the late 1990s it was already apparent, both within and outside Hareidi circles, that Lord Acton’s dictum that power corrupts applied to Hareidim no less than to others. The most obvious evidence was the number of Hareidi Knesset members sent to jail for various forms of corrupt practices. Although I would tend to accept the Shas argument that its representatives, and Aryeh Deri in particular, were victims of a political witch-hunt inspired by the Ashenazi/ left-liberal “elites,” that doesn’t make them innocent—it just means they were picked on and picked off.

However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the peccadilloes of specific Knesset members and ministers were only the tip of a much larger iceberg. In effect, Hareidi political power resulted in Hareidi society becoming entirely dependent on the government budget. In other words, Hareidi Judaism—despite its proclaimed ideology of separation, self-sacrifice, and asceticism and its efforts to dissociate itself from Zionist ideology—turned itself into a branch of the Israeli welfare state. Nor did this happen by accident; the process became self-supporting  as more and more Hareidi leaders, their entourages and their institutions, became increasingly dependent on funding whose ultimate source was the government budget—and hence the Israeli taxpayer. True, there was an alternative source of funding, namely foreign donations. But after the fall of the Reichman brothers’ empire in the early 1990s, the illusion that one family had been designated by Providence to support the entire edifice of Israeli Hareidism was shattered. Foreign donations remained an ongoing source of support, but its role was increasingly to provide jam, while the bread and butter came from the Israeli government. The lesson of the rise and fall of the Reichmans seemed to be that no wealthy individual, however mind-bogglingly rich, could play the central role. The national budget was larger, more accessible and seemingly more dependable.

But government funding was earmarked for two main areas: education and welfare. As a result, both saw massive expansion. They became the focal points of activity for every entrepreneurially oriented Hareidi so that, sadly and ironically, they became the main “industries” within the Hareidi business sector. Furthermore, since the new generation of Hareidi entrepreneurs had neither experience nor formal education, management of the new entities was characterized by inefficiencies, superfluity, and corruption.

Educational establishments proliferated, each one of which was a business venture in an increasingly competitive market. The more successful entities, whether by design or by accident, became involved in real estate, catering and wedding halls, and other legitimate business operations. As for illegitimate activities, the reader is referred to the media and/or Google for more details.

The overall picture was one of rapid, headlong, and unplanned growth, in which the nimble and well-connected came out on top, while a wider class of political machers, public relations, marketing, and other consultants, along with the managers of the NGOs, emerged as an embryonic Hareidi upper-middle class. But there was nothing below them, other than a mass of yeshiva/ kollel families, dependent on meager stipends and living near or actually in relative poverty, as the cost of feeding, educating, and marrying off their numerous children consumed their small incomes. 

The Secular Backlash

The Halpert Law proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. By pushing their political power too far, the Hareidim triggered a political backlash on the part of secular, middle-class Israelis, against what was commonly called “Hareidi blackmail.” Since the two big parties were unwilling to clash with the Hareidi sector directly, the protest movement found a new outlet in the form of a new party, Shinui, which not only called itself  “the secular list” but was openly and stridently anti-Hareidi. Its leaders were indeed anti-religious, but most of its supporters were probably not; they, too, were concerned with money rather than ideology, above all with who paid taxes and who received benefits—as well as with who served in the army and did reserve duty and who didn’t.

One of the most remarkable of the many political parties to shoot across the Israeli political firmament, Shinui may arguably be regarded as the most successful. In its first election effort, in 1999, it won six seats, a highly respectable performance, but not enough to change the balance of power. But by the next general election, the country was in a very different position. The hopes of peace and security prevalent in 1999 had been dashed by the second intifada and the suicide bombing campaign, while the prosperity engendered by the high-tech dot.com boom had been expunged by the “tech-wreck” and a global recession. These, coupled with the impact of the suicide bombings on the domestic economy, had plunged Israel into the longest and most severe recession in the country’s history. Tax revenues plummeted—but expenditures continued to rise, as the welfare structure created in the 1990s was impervious to the ups and downs of the economy. The result was a massive budget deficit and a financial crisis in 2002, which occurred against a background of serial suicide bombings and an Israeli counter-offensive against the Palestinian terrorist groups—Operation “Defensive Wall.”

There had been serious tensions between Hareidim and secularists in 2000 over Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s “secular agenda” and what Hareidim perceived as excessive Supreme Court activism. But the events of 2002 exposed the Hareidi sector to an unprecedented degree: they paid little tax but received a disproportionate share of the government’s expenditure and, as usual, they played no role in the military campaign. All this made Shinui’s message resonate widely so that, with the help of a vigorous and nasty election campaign, the party won 15 seats in the election of February 2003, making it the third-biggest party in the Knesset and an obvious coalition partner for the Likud—which, led by Ariel Sharon, had won a tremendous victory, garnering 40 (out of 120) Knesset seats.

The election outcome enabled Sharon to turn Israeli politics on its head and build a coalition in which all the Hareidi parties—including Shas, to its amazement and horror—were excluded. Sharon appointed Binyamin Netanyahu as Finance Minister, with the seemingly Herculean task of pulling the battered economy into shape, and these two used their parliamentary majority and the atmosphere of dire crisis to rapidly legislate a series of sweeping reforms. In addition to rationalizing the tax system to generate higher revenues, Netanyahu homed in on the expenditure side, which was plainly out of control. Inevitably, justifiably, and predictably, he took a machete to the sprawling welfare system that had been constructed and of which the Hareidim were the prime beneficiaries.

In the course of 2003–2004, the overall amounts of government funding to the Hareidi sector fell drastically, probably by one-third, perhaps even more. The main blow was the slashing of child allowances, but the yeshiva stipends and other elements were also pruned. Not surprisingly, the Hareidim came to call this development “the Netanyahu gezeros” (decrees, a term usually applied to anti-Jewish laws by gentile anti-Semitic regimes). The alternative would have been to admit that they and their leadership had, through greed, short-sightedness, and sheer stupidity, set themselves up for this disaster. But whatever label is used, this was the watershed event that marked the end of the Hareidi welfare-state society that had been constructed over the previous three decades.

The sheer scale of the implosion in funding caused massive distress for many Hareidi families and forced many institutions to merge or close altogether. Objectively—and if the government’s aim was indeed to incentivize Hareidim to move from welfare into the workforce, as it claimed—then the cuts should have been phased in gradually, over a period of 5-10 years. But the immediate need was to stem the hemorrhaging in the national budget and, in this context, the swollen welfare budgets were the obvious targets. The result was traumatic—and that trauma set Hareidi society on a new path.

From Crisis of Confidence to a New Model of Hareidism

The immediate task facing the Hareidi leadership in the wake of the so-called gezeros was to address the crisis as best they could. In practice, beyond an emergency fund-raising campaign, the pain could only be eased gradually, as the Israeli and global economies began to recover. But the situation began to improve perhaps faster than might have been expected. The domestic scene changed: Shinui imploded in a welter of internal feuding and corruption charges, and soon disappeared entirely from the political scene—as far as its voters were concerned, its mission completed. Subsequent governments recognized that the cuts imposed by Netanyahu had been too drastic and allowed some increases in child allowances.

Meanwhile, a new development was sweeping the economies of the main developed countries where large Hareidi centers had developed. The greatest real-estate boom ever seen was minting millionaires seemingly by the minute, and a rich new vein of foreign funding opened up. For five years, from 2004 through 2008, unprecedented sums of money poured into the Israeli Hareidi sector, not just in the form of donations, but also as investments in real-estate and other businesses. The wider Israeli public was largely unaware of this, but anyone walking through the Hareidi quarters of Jerusalem and other Hareidi population centers could hardly fail to notice the surge of construction activity.

Once again, however, as with the Reichman saga 20 years earlier, the hope that foreign sources could replace the Israeli government in whole or part proved illusory. The real-estate crash in the United States and the subsequent financial and economic crisis in the West wiped out many of the new Hareidi tycoons, and, together with a series of scandals within the Hareidi Diaspora, served to eliminate key sources of funds, with the inflow drying up much faster than it had expanded.

Nor was the new money, even when it was available, a true replacement for the funds lost via the “gezeros.” Donations went via intermediaries, who generally took a hefty cut for themselves, to institutions and organizations, wherein a new Hareidi executive class began to emerge and adopt a lifestyle to match. The government money, or what was left of it, went to individuals and families who desperately needed it—although they then had to turn to the charity organizations to supplement it.  Thus the real-estate driven prosperity of 2004–2008 aggravated the existing income and wealth gaps within Hareidi society, with the majority of the Hareidi poor being left steadily further behind.

Meanwhile, even as the chimera of Diaspora real-estate money came and went, far-reaching changes were taking place in Israel, both inside and outside of the Hareidi sector:

• Beginning in 2003, the Israeli economy began what was to become its longest-ever period of economic expansion. Although the global crisis of 2008 hit the Israeli economy too, its impact was short and after two tough quarters, the economy bounced back and resumed its growth path. In hindsight, the period 2003–2010 can be seen as “seven fat years” in which Israel surged ahead and prosperity became widespread. However, massive income and wealth gaps developed, with Hareidim and Israeli Arabs standing out as the two main population groups left out of the party.
• If the economic success story is well-known, the extraordinary developments in Israeli demography since 2003 are not. Yet the data are official, regularly updated, and clear-cut. They show that a) since the slashing of child allowances the Hareidi birth-rate has trended lower (as has that of the Bedouins); b) the birth-rate among non-Hareidi Israelis has steadily risen; c) the birth-rate among Israeli Arabs continues along its long-term declining trend.
• Within the overall economic success story, the single most important datum is not widely known. This is that the participation rate in the labor force has risen steadily and is now at a record-high level of 58 percent. This rate is still extremely low by Western standards, but the upward trend is the critical factor. One of the causes of this improvement, perhaps a central one, is the increase in the rate of participation among Hareidim, including Hareidi males.
• Within Hareidi society, major changes are underway. Three, in particular, need to be highlighted, relating to a) politics, b) sociology, and c) psychology. Space only permits presenting these in “headline” form, but each is worthy of close examination.

Hareidi politics: The evidence of a crisis of leadership in Hareidi society is most evident in the political sphere, where it can actually be measured. The most obvious evidence is the failure of the Hareidi parties to increase their representation in recent elections, despite surging growth in the Hareidi voting population. This suggests that Hareidi votes, especially younger ones, are leaking away to non-Hareidi parties—a suspicion supported by reading of the Hareidi and non-Hareidi media and by anecdotal evidence. In addition to voting patterns in general elections, the faction- and personality-based feuding within the Hareidi political scene—the municipal elections in Betar and Jerusalem in 2008 are outstanding examples—is forcing many young Hareidim to the conclusion that their interests are not being promoted by traditional Hareidi parties. More generally, the shrinking of government support has revealed that Hareidi politics has become entirely focused on obtaining government funding and providing jobs through patronage, and has shed its ideological underpinnings.  Now that Hareidi parties are unable to provide sufficient funds or jobs to answer their constituencies’ needs, they have lost their validity and with it, increasingly, their support.

Hareidi sociology: The “gezeros” left  most Hareidim over the age of 35 with insufficient income to support their large families—and without education, training, or any practical means of finding jobs in the wider economy. Overnight, they became a “wilderness generation”—and the Hareidi leadership has not been able to provide systemic solutions to the crisis. The conclusion drawn by many younger Hareidim—especially those who are, for one reason or another, uncomfortable with or unsuitable to the yeshiva/ kollel lifestyle—is that they must look out for themselves. Specifically, they must be able to earn a living. This is fuelling a steady increase in the number of young Hareidim attending colleges and even universities, as well as vocational courses, in a broad range of fields. These efforts are being funded and guided by, inter alia, the Joint Distribution Committee, numerous individual philanthropists, and institutional philanthropies from overseas, as well as various Israeli government ministries and agencies—including most branches of the IDF.

 This means that the front line of Hareidi integration into Israeli society is now the labor market—but also that serving in the IDF, after yeshiva and perhaps some kollel study, is acceptable. The envelope is being pushed steadily outward, both in quantitative terms—the number of people involved—and in qualitative terms, meaning the kinds of things they do.

As this process moves forward, it is creating a genuine Hareidi bourgeoisie—people with real jobs and businesses that create income and wealth, rather than party apparatchiks and “welfare entrepreneurs” whose business arena is the Hareidi “hessed” empires that are the hallmarks of the sector’s poverty and welfare-dependence.

Hareidi psychology: This point is based more on subjective impressions than hard data, but it seems to me both correct and a logical accompaniment to and outcome of the preceding points. In Kennedy-style terms, we can speak of the torch being passed—more correctly, seized—by a new generation of Hareidim, who have come of age in the twenty-first century, tempered by terror and war, disciplined by a severe financial but also spiritual crisis, proud of its ancient heritage, and unwilling to impose on the next generation the ideals of genteel poverty on which it was brought up. Furthermore, this new generation sees and feels itself to be entirely Israeli, an integral part of the multi-cultural mosaic that is the State of Israel today. Unlike their grandparents, they feel no need to molder on the margins of society, and unlike their parents, they do not carry an inbuilt inferiority complex vis-à-vis secular or religious Israelis. Many of them are beginning to realize that they have much to give to the wider society and also much to learn from it, because—contrary to what they were told in school—they and their leaders do not have all the answers. Above all they are convinced, on the basis of what they have seen both in Israel and among their peers in the Diaspora, that it is possible to live a Hareidi lifestyle and yet interact, where necessary, with the wider society.

These new trends are the antithesis of the old-style welfare-state Hareidism. The battle between the two is ongoing and will take time to resolve, but the global reversal of the welfare state model ensures that the old system is doomed. The future of Hareidism lies with the new generation, which is engaged in a live experiment of adapting its lifestyle to a new socio-economic reality.

The track record of Hareidim in adapting to new circumstances is a good one. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the wider Israeli society, including the government and the main institutions of the state, are strongly supportive of this effort. How exactly it will turn out cannot be known—because the future is unknown. But too much hangs on the outcome of this effort, for the Hareidim, for the strength and cohesion of the State of Israel, and for the future of the Jewish people, for it to fail.